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General Introduction
Since the 16th century, France and Spain were the first who used the term
"sovereign default" in their financial dictionary, and since then sovereign default
event has spread in many emerging and developed countries during the next cen-
tury (Reinhart and K. S. Rogoff 2011).
Looking back at the economic crises in recent years hitting Asia in the 90s,
Latin America in 2000s and the global finance in 2007 until now, all underlined
the important role of measuring the sovereign default risk for researchers and
policy makers. In this study, the sovereign default is defined as a situation where
a country’s government loses the ability to pay its debt and choose to default.
Based on the default history of emerging countries, the majority of default cases
are in the latter because they have borrowed too much in foreign currency and are
unable to repay its debt. Hence, we focus on the problem of sovereign default in
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emerging countries in the thesis.
The debate about the determinant of the sovereign default risk is an interesting
question for researchers and economists. In fact, there are three big credit rating
agencies such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings who publish the
sovereign credit rating of the ability to debt reimbursement and the likelihood of
default. However, many researchers and economists do not believe in their rating
(scientific point of view) because they do not publish the methodology used in
obtaining their rating (Cohen 2013). Hence, the sovereign default risk has become
a highly interesting subject.
Consequently, two main questions are addressed in this study, including: how
can we determine and evaluate the sovereign default risk in emerging countries?
And what type of models and indicators that best express the sovereign default
risk?
In order to answer these questions, an article that drew my attention is called
the "Contingent Claims Approach to measuring and managing sovereign credit
risk" for Gray et al. 2007. This article showed how to calculate the sovereign
default probability by transferring the credit risk model to sovereign credit risk.
This method was based on the option pricing theory of Black and Scholes 1973 and
sovereign balance sheet. An empirical results of Brazil’s crisis for the period 2002-
2005 highlighted the sovereign credit risk indicator of Brazil is homogeneous with
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the sovereign credit default swap, which is a proxy of sovereign default risk. Be-
sides, Karmann and Maltritz 2009 focussed on how to calculate directly sovereign’s
ability-to-pay as the sum of all foreign exchange reserves and the discounted steady
state capital flow of balance trade.
In addition, the economic policies are modelled when a government decides to
defaults, in several cases such as the role of bargaining power of reducing debt (Yue
2010; Andrade 2009; Jeanneret 2013), the incentive to issue debt (Jeanneret 2013)
and the acceptance to pay the default cost in order to choose to default (Panizza
2008; Arellano 2008; Andrade and Chhaochharia 2011).
Furthermore, a number of empirical results study the effect of the fundamental
macroeconomics and financial index on the sovereign default risk proxies, such
as sovereign CDS spread (Georgievska et al. 2008; IMF-Report 2013), sovereign
yield spread (Hernandez-Trillo 1995; Baek et al. 2005; Hilscher and Nosbusch
2010; Ramos-Francia and Rangel 2012), Emerging Market Bond Index Plus (Fer-
rucci 2003; Petrova et al. 2010; Rowland and Torres 2004; Jaramillo and Tejada
2011). These studies regress the sovereign default proxies and take the following
as explanatory variables, namely, government’s solvency, government’s liquidity
and macroeconomic situation. These regressions take into account the influence
of these explanatory variables to the sovereign default proxies over a specific pe-
riod, and do not examine the effect in the long-run and short-run. However, each
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method has advantages and limitations. Hence, in this study we will fill the gaps
in the literature on the determination of sovereign default risk.
The structure of the thesis
Before presenting the research objectives of the thesis, we present briefly the
structure of my thesis. This dissertation consists of five chapters. The remainder
of the dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 1: Literature review of sovereign default.
Chapter 2: A structural sovereign default model: Evidence from Argentina
Chapter 3: A stochastic model of sovereign default risk.
Chapter 4: Long-run determinant of sovereign CDS spread in emerging coun-
tries.
Chapter 5: Long-run determinant of sovereign bond in emerging countries:
New evidence from asymmetric and nonlinear pass-through
Research Objective and Methodology
The main objective of this thesis is to determine and evaluate the sovereign
default risk, and the sovereign risk indicators. The underlying aims of my disser-
tation are the following:
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— To review the determinant of sovereign default risk.
— To transpose the credit risk model in corporate level to the sovereign risk
level, and calculate the default probability of Argentina.
— To calculate the sovereign credit spread from two default policies: increase
corporate income tax and reduce a part of debt.
— To study the long-run determinant of the Sovereign CDS spread in the fol-
lowing emerging market: Brazil, Malaysia, South Korean, Thailand, Turkey,
South Africa, Indonesia and Mexico.
— To study the asymmetric long-run and short-run determinant of sovereign
bond index, a proxy of sovereign default, for two typical emerging countries:
Turkey and Brazil.
In order to achieve the above stated objectives, chapter 1 describes the related
literature of sovereign default risk; Chapter 2 examines the sovereign default prob-
ability indicator; Chapter 3 identifies a stochastic model to calculate the Daily
Sovereign Credit Spread; Chapter 4 determines the long-run Sovereign Credit De-
fault Swaps spread for eight emerging markets; and the last chapter provides an
asymmetric non-linear model to estimate sovereign bond index for Turkey and
Brazil.
The first chapter begins by detailing the literature about sovereign default
in the panorama, namely, history of sovereign default, how we can understand the
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sovereign default, and its principal models. These models are: structural model,
econometric model through CDS sovereign or yield spread sovereign, and dynamic
stochastic model. Hence, this chapter aims to build a theoretical foundation upon
which the research is based by reviewing the relevant literature to identify research
issues, highlighting those that have not been answered by previous researchers.
The second chapter transposes the credit risk model in corporate level to
the sovereign risk level. We base our research on the pricing option of Black &
Scholes (1973) and the credit risk model of Merton (1974), and the work of Gray
and Malone 2008 by using the sovereign balance sheet. The "central variable" in
this chapter is the "sovereign equity" which is the sum of domestic currency debt
and monetary base. This variable is determined as a call option. A case study is
applied to Argentina for the period 1997 - 2010.
Our result shows that Argentina’s default probability in the structural model
is very fluctuating in regards to this country’s. The limitation in this chapter is
the data availability of the domestic-currency debt is only found from the period
of 1997 to 2010.
This chapter is presented at 2nd Annual Doctoral Workshop JRD
2013 in Paris, France.
The third chapter presents a dynamic stochastic model, in which we tried to
calculate the sovereign credit spread from two default policies that we proposed.
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We opt for two policies, the first one is when a country choose to default and its
government will negotiate with its lenders to reduce a part of its debt. Paralleled
with this policy, the government will increase the corporate income tax. An empir-
ical study is applied for four emerging countries: Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Turkey
over the period 2000 - 2011.
Our results can be summarized as follows: firstly, the evolution of modelled
sovereign credit spread is fairly homogeneous with a benchmarked sovereign credit
spread; secondly, the sign and Adjusted R-square value explain a strong relation-
ship between the estimated sovereign credit spread and the benchmarked one;
finally, the existence of co-integration in long-run between the estimated sovereign
credit risk and the benchmark. This means that the evolution in the long-run of
modelled sovereign credit spread co-integrates with the benchmark.
This chapter is presented at 63rd Annual Congress of the French
Economic Association in Lyon, France; 14th FRAP - Finance, Risk
and Accounting Perspectives Conference in Oxford, England 1.
The fourth chapter carries on the study of the long-run determinant the
Sovereign CDS spread in emerging market: Brazil, Malaysia, South Korean, Thai-
land, Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia and Mexico for the period 2008 -2013. In
order to proceed, we present a new econometric approach: Pooled Mean Group
(PMG) estimation. By using Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model and
1. This conference is in the top conferences in Banking, Economics and Finance 2014
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PMG (M Hashem Pesaran et al. 1997, 1999), we find the long-run determinant of
Sovereign CDS (a proxy of sovereign risk) from the fundamental macroeconomics
variables, namely, the current account balance to GDP, the external debt to GDP
and the international reserves to GDP. These three variables represent the gov-
ernment’s solvency, liquidity and macroeconomics variables (Georgievska et al.,
2008).
Our findings can be summarized as follows: firstly, the existence of co-integration
between these variables indicated above; secondly, the coefficients of the current
account, the external debt and international reserves are significant and expected
vis-à-vis theoretical economics in the long-run for all countries. From the policy
maker’s point of view, in order to reduce the country risk, the government should
have focused to increase more reserves than focus on solving two factors: the ex-
ternal debt and the current account; finally, in the short-run the external debt and
the international reserves are significant.
This chapter is presented at 1st Vietnam International Conference
in Finance in Hanoi, Vietnam .
The last chapter studies the asymmetric long-run and short-run determi-
nant of sovereign bond index, a proxy of sovereign default, for two typical emerg-
ing countries: Turkey and Brazil for the period 2000 -2011. The determinant of
sovereign bond index is estimated from three macroeconomic factors: the current
General Introduction 9
account, the external debt and the international reserves. We use positive and
negative partial sum composition of the current account in order to determine
asymmetric effect to sovereign bond. Our findings can be summarized as follow:
firstly, the long-run relationship between the sovereign bond and explanatory vari-
ables exists; secondly, we detect only asymmetric long-run effect for Turkey and
both asymmetric short-run and long-run effect for Brazil; finally, the asymmetric
long-run effect is greater than symmetric effect for both Turkey and Brazil. The
limitation in this chapter is the non-availability of data for a long period of time
for the EMBI.
This chapter is presented at 2nd Paris Financial Management Con-
ference (PFMC2014).
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CHAPTER 1
Literature review of sovereign default
This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, we present the history
of sovereign default. In the second section, we briefly show the cost of sovereign
default. The important contribution of this chapter is highlighted in the third sec-
tion that reviews the background of the sovereign default risk, and three principal
approaches to evaluate and to determine the sovereign default risk. And finally,
the last section covers the conclusion.
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1.1 History of sovereign default
In this section, we will answer the following questions:
— What is a sovereign default?
— Why does sovereign default?
— What are the causes and the costs of sovereign default?
There are many different discussions about the definition of sovereign default.
In the first hand, from a legal point of view, in the debt contracts, there are
two principal points: scheduled and reimbursed amount. According to Hatchondo
et al. 2007, a sovereign default occurs when a scheduled debt service is not paid
on time specified in the debt contracts. However, sovereign default is defined by
Reinhart and K. S. Rogoff 2011 as the failure of a government to meet a principal
or interest payment on the due date (or within the specified grace period). Tomz
and Wright 2013 show generally that default occurs when the debtor violates the
legality of the debt contract. Gray et al. 2007; Gray and Malone 2008 propose
that sovereign default occurs when the market value of sovereign asset is below
the contractual sovereign liabilities. In the other hand, from credit ratings agen-
cies’ view, a sovereign default when the sovereign breaks the contract, or when
the sovereign "tenders an exchange offer of new debt with less favorable terms
than the original issue" (Beers and Chambers 2006, Standard and Poor’s). In
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addition, Hatchondo et al. 2007 consider a "technical" default as an episode in
which the sovereign makes a restructuring offer that contains terms less favorable
than the original debt. Further, Kulatilaka and Marcus 1987 state that sovereign
default occurs when the present value of consumption under default first exceeds
the present value given continuance of debt service. Andrade 2009 argues that
sovereign default occurs after bad endowment shocks and has negative implica-
tions for subsequent economic growth.
Reinhart and K. Rogoff 2009 summarize four reasons why the government of
a country go to sovereign crisis, and tend to default:(i) the external and domestic
debt of government highly increase; (ii) Banking crisis; (iii) Hyper-Inflation 1 and
(iiii) Currency crashes 2.
We will proceed by explaining the two types of debt: domestic and exter-
nal debt. There are several approaches to determine the external debt and the
domestic debt. The first approach is based on currency of issued debt, i.e. foreign-
currency debt is considered external debt, and local-currency debt is domestic
debt. But, the limitation of this approach is that in reality some countries that
issue the foreign-currency debt in the internal market, and issue domestic-currency
debt in the international market. The second approach is based on the residence
of the creditor, i.e. foreign-currency debt comes from non-residents debt (Panizza
1. Hyper-Inflation is inflation rate of 40% per month.
2. Currency crashes: A currency crash is the final diver of sovereign risk, when a country is
in a state of default, the exchange rate has an annual depreciation of 15% and more.
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(2008), BIS 3). Reinhart and K. Rogoff 2009 show that creditors often determine
all debt’s terms of the debt contracts.
The history of default on the domestic and external debt is rich. Generally
speaking, a government can choose to default on external debt or domestic debt.
It is noteworthy that not only the external debt is dangerous, because the domestic
sovereign debt is enormous, and default on domestic debt is more complex than
external debt. In the paper of Reinhart and K. S. Rogoff 2011, the domestic debt
accounts two-third of total public debt from the period 1914 to 2010, as Figure
1.1 shows. Government’s incentives default on domestic debt will lead to inflation
or hyperinflation, i.e. Argentina’s default from the year 1824 until 2001, there are
two defaults on domestic debt, one in 1824 and the other in 1999, also in 2001
Argentina defaults on external debt. If a government is hesitating to default on
domestic debt because of inflationary consequence, then it can default on external
debt.
Reinhart et al. 2003 4 showed that during the 16th-19th century, European
countries did default many times (e.g. Germany did six defaults, France did eight
defaults, Spain did thirteen defaults, Portugal did six defaults and Greece did four
defaults). To add, in the 20th-21th century, the world economic situation is always
highly volatile, there are eighty-four events of sovereign default from 1975 to 2002
3. Bank for International Settlements
4. Table 2 in their article
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(a) (b)
Source : The League of Nation, the United Nations, cite from Reinhart and
K. Rogoff 2009
Figure 1.1: Domestic public debt as a share of total debt: Advanced economic
(a), Emerging market economies (b), 1900-2007
according to Standard and Poor’s. Tomz and Wright 2013 show two-hundred-and-
fifty sovereign defaults by 106 countries between 1820 and 2004.
A timeline of sovereign default history presents the following:
— The beginning of the emerging market economies default in 1930s and the
debt crisis of the 1980s, 1990s: Mexico’s default in 1983 and in 1994, Brazil’s
financial crisis in 1998 and in 2002, and Uruguay’s default in 2002,
— the debt crisis of the 1990s in Eurasia (Thailand’s crisis in 1997 and Rus-
sian’s crisis in 1998),
— the financial crisis in United State in the 2000s,
— the largest default in Argentina in 2002 (defaulted on $82 billions of external
debt),
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— the sovereign default in European countries in recent years.
1.2 The cost of sovereign default
Defaults are costly both to the creditors and the debtors. Andrade and Chhaochharia
2011 define that the cost of sovereign default is equal to the sum of a long-run in-
crease in the cost of corporate equity capital and a long-run reduction in the
average growth rate of corporate earnings following sovereign default. Their re-
sults show that the cost of sovereign default is 5.1 % for Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain from the period 2006 to 2010.
Borensztein and Panizza 2008 present four possible costs of sovereign default:
loss of reputation, reductions in trade, costs to the domestic economy and political
costs. They conclude that the cost of sovereign default is significant, but short-
lived (not significant after 1 year).
First cost is the cost of reputation, i.e., a government borrows easily money
from international capital markets if it has a good reputation. In addition, the
reputation influences credit ratings and also interest rate spread. Borensztein and
Panizza 2008 show that a default has a direct negative impact, short-live on credit
rating (1 to 3 years): the sovereign spread increases 250 to 400 basis points in 2
years after the default. But these effects are rather short-lived (not statistically
significant after two or three years).
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Second cost is reductions in trade, i.e., the possibility of trade sanctions (J.
Bulow and Rogoff 1989). Borensztein and Panizza 2008 find a essential trade
impact on sovereign default caused by a decline in trade credit during the four
years following the default by using industry-level data, but these effects are also
short lived (only last two to three years). Reinhart et al. (2003) and Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer (2006) also emphasise that the costs of defaulting on external
debt can be significant for a country’s trade.
Third cost is costs to the domestic economy: sovereign defaults have a direct
impact on growth (Herndon et al. 2013; Borensztein and Panizza 2008). Herndon
et al. 2013 5 find that the economic growth has just reduced by about 2.2 % when a
country has the public debt/GDP ratio above 90 %. Borensztein and Panizza 2008
display that the relationship between the output growth and default is negative in
the year of default, i.e., the growth rate decreases by 2,5 %. However, they find
no significant growth effect in the years that follow the default episode and the
economic costs are not large, the reasonable is last cost below.
Last cost is political costs: all sovereign defaults was recovery its economic by
using currency devaluation as IMF requests South-east Asian countries to devalue
its currency in the financial crisis (1997). This politic has been revived theses
South-east Asian country by exports through devaluating own fiat currency by
5. He finds an error of a famous article of Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. (2010)
"Growth in a Time of Debt" American Economic Review, 100(2): 573-78. Two economist find
the economic growth has just reduced about 1%
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30-50 % (Borensztein and Panizza, 2008).
1.3 Three main approaches of sovereign default
This section reviews three predominant approaches that evaluate the sovereign
default risk. The first approach is the structural model based on the pricing option;
the second approach is the econometric models which determine the sovereign
default risk proxies by the macroeconomic fundamentals; and finally, the dynamic
stochastic model.
Before presenting these approaches, Table 1.1 shows the list of sovereign default
risk indicators. The definition of each indicator can be seen in the following section.
Sovereign default risk indicator Authors
Sovereign default probability Mellios and Paget-Blanc 2006; Gray et al.
2007; Souto et al. 2007; Karmann and Mal-
tritz 2009; François et al. 2011; Jeanneret
2008, 2013
Sovereign CDS spread, Sovereign
CDS premia
Chan-Lau 2003, 2006; IMF-Report 2013
Sovereign credit spread,
Sovereign yield spread
Hernandez-Trillo 1995; Baek et al. 2005;
Hilscher and Nosbusch 2010; Ramos-Francia
and Rangel 2012
Sovereign bond, Emerging Mar-
ket Bond Index
Ferrucci 2003; Petrova et al. 2010; Rowland
and Torres 2004; Jaramillo and Tejada 2011
Sovereign credit rating Rating Agency
Table 1.1: Sovereign default risk indicators list
In this thesis, we propose four methods to determine four indicators of the
sovereign default risk: the sovereign default probability, the sovereign CDS spread,
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the sovereign credit spread and Emerging Market Bond Index Plus (EMBI+).
1.3.1 Sovereign default risk via the structural model
How can sovereign default risk be modelled ? There are many papers about the
structure model of sovereign default. Sovereign default model is developed from
the corporate credit risk model. The original corporate credit risk model began
with Merton’s credit risk model (Robert C Merton 1974) based on the option
pricing theory of Black and Scholes 1973 under the perfect market assumption 6.
Suppose at time T , a firm has an asset AT that is financed by equity ET
and zero-coupon debt DT , represented by the following formula: AT = ET + DT .
The market value of the firm’s asset dynamics AT follows a Geometric Brownian
Motion:
dA
A
= µdt+ σAdW (1.1)
where µ, σ are the drift and volatility of the asset.
The Merton’s credit risk model proves that corporate debt can be interpreted
as a short Put Option on the firm value, and corporate equity interpreted as a Call
option. Corporate default occurs when the firm value falls below its contractual
debt obligations. The outputs of this model calculate the firm’s asset value and
6. This assumption will interpret in chapter 2 of this thesis
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asset volatility by using information of firm’s liabilities on the firm’s balance sheet.
This model is also called Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA) model, and this was
improved by Black and Scholes 1973, Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), Kealhofer-
Merton-Vasicek (KMV,2000) and commercialized by Moody’s.
This idea was transposed from firm level to the sovereign level with extension
and modification. The sovereign default risk model was developed by Gray et
al. 2007; Karmann and Maltritz 2009; Souto et al. 2007; François et al. 2011;
Jeanneret 2008, 2013.
Gray et al. 2007 applied sovereign CCA balance sheet which interlinks balance
sheet of government and authorities to calculate the value of sovereign asset and
sovereign asset volatility. They based on perfect market assumption and added
one principal idea that supposed the sum of domestic currency debt plus monetary
base as sovereign equity. The goal of this model is to find the sovereign asset
that will be used to pay its public debt. Gray et al. 2007 applied this model for
Brazil, Turkey, Korean, Mexico, South Africa, Philippines in the period from 2002
to 2005. Their results show risk-neutral default probability that is compared to
CDS spread (5-years of CDS spread for Brazil, and 1-year of CDS spread for the
other countries) on sovereign foreign-currency debt to valid their model. Gray and
Jones 2006; Gapen et al. 2008 show that the sovereign default probability has a
high correlation with sovereign spreads 5-year.
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Souto et al. 2007 use the CCA method and the implied volatility of forward
exchange rate value in order to find the change of loan losses value in the main
economic sector for Turkey in the period 2001-2006. Their results reveal that when
interest rates and its volatility decrease, the trend of default probability and credit
spreads decline.
Instead of indirect calculation of sovereign asset value through sovereign eq-
uity, Karmann and Maltritz 2009 focus on how to calculate directly sovereign’s
ability-to-pay (not "willingness-to-pay"), as sum of all foreign exchange reserves
and the discounted steady state capital flow of balance trade, and using implicit
volatility technique to find annual default probability. Their model was applied
for 17 emerging markets 7 in the 1994-2002 period 8. The authors used Quadratic
Probability Score (QPS) to valid this model.
Default Probability Equation in Structural Model
Under the CCA model, Gray et al. 2007; Karmann and Maltritz 2009; Souto
et al. 2007; François et al. 2011 define the default as an event that occurs when
7. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, Venezuela
8. The country sample and time period are determined by the availability of market data:
Argentina (missing value in 1996,1997,2002), Brazil (missing value in 1994 to 1996,1999 to 2002),
Chile (missing value in 1994 to 1999), Colombia (missing value in 1994 to 1996 and 2000 to 2002),
Ecuador (missing value in 1994 to 1997, 2000,2002), Indonesia (missing value in 1995,1996, 1998
to 2002), Mexico (missing value in 1994,1996), Peru(missing value in 1994 to 1999), Philip-
pines(missing value in 1994 to 1996), Poland (missing value in 1994 to 1997), Romania (missing
value in 1994 to 1997), Russia (missing value in 1994, 1999 to 2001), South Africa (missing value
in 1994 to 1997), South Korea (missing value in 1994 to 2001), Turkey (missing value in 1994 to
1997, 2001,2002), Venezuela (missing value in 1994 to 1997)
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At < Dt, and the neutral-risk default probability 9 P is computed by:
P(At < Dt) = N (−d2,r) = N (−
Ln(A0
Dt
) + (r − 0, 5σ2)T
σ
√
T
) (1.2)
There are various definitions of the variables in equation (1.2), e.g: At is called
sovereign asset (Gray et al. 2007) or it is called ability-to-pay (Karmann and Mal-
tritz 2009); Dt is distress barrier, or total public debt or external debt or obligation
government debt; r risk-free interest rate; σ is volatility of the At process; T is
maturity.
Default point
For the structural model, there must exist a default point/default threshold to
calculate default probability. Borensztein and Panizza 2008 show "default point"
should be the point at which cost of servicing debt is higher than cost of incurred
restructure in the contractual terms. Kulatilaka and Marcus 1987 assume nation
output (GDP) as continuous-time stochastic to find timing decision of strategic
default. They called a critical value as a default point at which "the present value of
consumption under default first exceeds the present value given continuance of debt
service". Gray et al. 2007 use the definition of the default barrier of De Servigny
and Renault (2007) who used the ratio between long term foreign currency debt
and short term foreign currency debt to define the default barrier. Default barrier
9. We can see the proof more detail in the chapter 2 of this thesis
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is equal to foreign currency debt in short term plus a half of foreign currency debt
in long term. But Karmann and Maltritz 2009 use total public debt as default
point.
Model’s Limitations
Because of the Merton’s model based on perfect market assumptions, the Mer-
ton’s model has four main restrictions as follows:
— The default can occur only at maturity date of debt.
— There is a constant risk-free rate during tested period.
— The asset volatility is constant during tested period.
— There is fixed default point that is equal to total debt.
There are some papers that try to improve theses limitations in corporate level:
The first extension is presented by Black and Cox (1976) relating the default time.
Precisely, the default may occur at any time before maturity if the firm’s asset value
in this moment goes bellow a deterministic barrier, called "safety convenants",
depending on time. In this model, the shareholders receive continuous dividend
payments (κ is payout ratio) which are proportional to the value of firm’s assets
(A):
dA
A
= (µ− κ)dt+ σAdW (1.3)
The "safety convenants" give the firm’s bondholders a right to force the firm
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to bankruptcy or reorganization if the firm’s asset value bellows a standard deter-
ministic barrier which is computed by: K(t) = Ke−ϑ(T−t), t ∈ [0, T ].
The default probability in the Black & Cox’s model is calculated by:
P = N (h1) + eθN (h2) (1.4)
where θ = 2{(µ− σ
2
v
2
)lnK
V0
(
1
σ2v
)};
N (h1) =
ln K
eµTV0
+ 0.5σ2vT
σv
√
T
and h2 = N (h1)− σv
√
T .
Although the Black& Cox’s model corrects a strong hypothesis of the Merton’s
model. In deed, the default can occur at any time before maturity. Nevertheless,
this model reminds not realistic since it is based on strong hypotheses of the
Merton’s model.
The second extension is presented by Vasicek’s model. This model describes
the evolution of interest rate (rt) that follows a process: drt = a(b− rt)dt+ σdW ,
where a is the speed of reversion and b is the long term mean level.
The third extension is presented firstly by Heston 1993; Heston and Nandi 2000
who show a stochastic volatility process by using GARCH model. In this model,
he assumes a asset followed:
dA(t)
A
= µdt+
√
σ(t)dW1(t) (1.5)
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and the volatility follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
d
√
σ(t) = −β√σ(t)dt+ δdW2(t), W1(t) has correlation ρ with W2(t).
Based on the Heston 1993; Heston and Nandi 2000 model, Fouque et al. 2008
develop a model of multi-factor stochastic volatility. The stochastic volatility
models of Heston 1993; Heston and Nandi 2000; Fouque et al. 2008 solve a strong
hypothesis of constant volatility in the Merton’s model.
The detailed calculation of asset value and the default probability can be seen
in the original article of Vasicek (1977); Heston 1993; Heston and Nandi 2000;
Fouque et al. 2008.
But theses extended models are difficult to apply in the sovereign level because
we cannot aggregate asset value of all components in the economy.
1.3.2 Sovereign default risk via econometric models
The second approach of sovereign default is the econometric models. This
section aims at providing an overview of the determinants of sovereign CDS spread,
sovereign credit spread and the EMBI+ by the macroeconomic fundamentals.
Sovereign CDS spread
Before defining the sovereign CDS spread, we present briefly the CDS contract,
the relationship between the CDS and the default probability, and its application
to evaluate the sovereign default probability.
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Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a credit derivative contract: a buyer of CDS,
or protection buyer (e.g. a bank), purchases a CDS contract against the event of
default and will pay a premium, that is called CDS spread. If an event of default
occurs, an investor has to compensate the protection buyer for the loss. In other
words, CDS is a form of insurance to protect what the borrowers are unable to
repay. In general, CDS is used to insure the bonds issued by a firm or a government.
Maturity for corporate issuers is 5-year, and its is from 1 to 10 years for sovereign
issuers. The CDS spread is expressed in base point, 100 basis points represent 1%.
For example: in 26/9/2008, the sovereign CDS spread in 5-year of Brazil is 167.06
basic point (source: Reuters). If the protection buyer wants to insure 10 millions
dollars, he must pay 835300 dollars in total, or 41765 dollar in quarterly during
five years. Thus, a greater CDS spread is associated with increasing bond risk.
Chan-Lau 2003, 2006 explains the relationship between the CDS spread and
the sovereign default probability. The default probability can be recovered directly
and can be predicted from the CDS spread. In fact, we assume a 1-year of CDS
contract. The protection seller has an expected loss, EL, equal to: EL = p(1−RR);
where p is the default probability, and RR is the expected recovery rate at default.
The recovery and default rate are assumed to be independent. The CDS spread, S
should be equal to the present value of the expected loss because it is a premium
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against default:
S =
P(1−RR)
1 + r
(1.6)
where r is the risk-free rate. If we known the CDS spread, the recovery rate and
the discount factor, we can calculate directly the default probability P .
Sovereign credit spread (SCS)
We must distinguish between the sovereign credit spread and the sovereign
CDS spread. The sovereign credit spread (or called sovereign yield spread) is the
differentials between yields on risky debt and those on what might be considered
risk-free government bonds (Remolona et al. 2007). The yield of risk-free govern-
ment bond is usually the yield of US bond, and the yield on risky debt is usually
a emerging country’s bond issued by the government. The sovereign credit spread
is computed in equation (1.7):
SCS = y − r (1.7)
where y is the yield to maturity on the risky debt and r is the risk-free interest
rate. If yield spread increases, the market is forecasting a greater risk of default
which implies a slowing economy (Simkovic and Kaminetzky 2011).
The relationship between the yield spread (Y S) and default probability is given
28 CHAPTER 1. Literature review of sovereign default
by: Y S =
EDF ∗ LGD
1− EDF , where EDF is the Expected Default Frequency, LGD is
the Loss-Given-Default. As this equation indices, an increase in the Yield Spread
suggests either an increase in the Expected Default Frequency or an increase in
the Loss-Given-Default.
Emerging Market Bond Index Plus
The final indicator that is presented in this section is the Emerging Market Bond
Index Plus (EMBI+). According to JP-Morgan 2004, the EMBI+ is a JPMorgan’s
index indicating total return for liquid sovereign debt in emerging markets as an
indicator of measure for sovereign default risk.
Determinants of sovereign risk proxies by the macroeconomic funda-
mentals
We begin by reviewing the literature on the determinants of sovereign risk
proxies by the macroeconomic fundamentals.
Hernandez-Trillo 1995 assumes that a government tries to maximize national
product that is used to repay its loan, and the government decides to default
on its loan. This model emphasizes on factors affecting the sovereign default
probability: the degree of openness, international reserves and the risk-free interest
rate. Further, he creates a spread index over LIBOR 10 and debt service ratio to
determine the sovereign default probability. The sovereign default probability is
10. London Interbank Offered Rate is short term interest rates, as the primary benchmark
around the world
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explained by a function of the degree of openness; the ratio between the official
exchange rate and the black market exchange rate and international reserves. His
result explains for 33 debtor countries where liberalization policies decrease the
default probability by both raising the GDP and increasing openness. This model
displays a negative effect of international reserves on the default decision. This
paper present only a theoretical model of default probability without empirical
results.
Cantor and Packer 1996 use a country’s ability and willingness-to-service its
debt as the explained variables for a panel of developing countries. They find six
variables affecting the sovereign credit rating which are per capita income, GDP
growth, inflation rate, external debt, default history and an economic development
indicator.
More recently, Ramos-Francia and Rangel 2012 estimate the relationship be-
tween the sovereign yield spread (explained variable) and the macroeconomic fun-
damentals in the period from January 2000 to December 2009. They create a
sovereign yield spread index as the difference between the yields on long term
government bonds and the yield on 10-year US Treasuries for the developed mar-
kets 11, and EMBI spreads is for the emerging markets 12. The macroeconomic
fundamentals variables are represented by inflation rate, economic growth, fiscal,
11. Canada, England, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, and Switzerland
12. Brazil, Chile,Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Peru, Philippines,Poland, Thailand, and Turkey
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current account deficits, international reserves and nominal exchange rate varia-
tions. These results explain that international reserves and exchange rate appreci-
ations are associated with lower default risk in emerging markets. In addition, the
inflation rate increase come with higher sovereign spreads, real growth rate has
negative effect on sovereign default risk. The impact of exchange rate variations
on the sovereign default is also found in J. I. Bulow and Rogoff 1988; Mellios and
Paget-Blanc 2006. They argue that the exchange rate variations have a direct
impact on a country’s terms of trade, which may affect the ability of the country
to generate dollar revenue and make payments on its external debt.
Baek et al. 2005 show the link between sovereign risk represented by Brandy
bond yield spread, and three principal explanatory variables: solvency variables
represented by real GDP growth rate, total external debt to GDP ratio and govern-
ment budget balance to GDP ratio, liquidity variables represented by international
reserves to import ratio and current account balance to GDP ratio, and economic
stability variables represented by inflation rate and changes in the real exchange
rate by using time-series cross-sectional equation with fixed effect. An empirical
studies for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines and Venezuela for the period
from 1992 to 1997 found that liquidity, solvency and economic stability variables
are significantly affecting the market premium of country risk.
Georgievska et al. 2008 provide the Bayesian approach to study the link be-
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tween the sovereign rescheduling probability and three classified variables explain-
ing sovereign default: total debt to GDP ratio and Export to GDP ratio repre-
sented solvency variables; international reserves to GDP ratio expressed liquidity
variable; currency account balance to GDP ratio and imports to GDP ratio vari-
ables represented macroeconomic variables for a panel of 124 emerging countries
during the 1981-2002 period.
Pan and Singleton 2008 focus on the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads,
and pricing sovereign CDS contracts. An empirical result for Mexico, Turkey, and
Korea in March 2001 until the beginning of August 2006 period show that risk
neutral intensities and loss rate describe the best CDS data. Longstaff et al. 2011
analyse the sovereign CDS spread into default risk and risk premium by using the
intensity model. They find that the sovereign CDS spread are driven by global
macroeconomics. In addition, Hilscher and Nosbusch 2010 examine the effect of
macroeconomic variables on probability through yield spread by using a linear
regression. He detects the volatility of term of trade that is significant with yield
spread.
IMF-Report 2013 introduces the determinants of the CDS spread by regressing
this latter on various economics and financial explanatory variables. The debt-to-
GDP ratio and GDP growth rate would be expected to increase the spread, whereas
international reserve would reduce it. This report suggests global or region-specific
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explanatory variables such as VIX (S&P 500 index), global equity return (1-month
US Treasury) and Funding cost (3-month LIBOR-OIS) that have impact on the
CDS spread.
These regressions take into account the influence of these explanatory variables
to the sovereign default proxies over a specific period, and do not examine the
effect in the long-run and short-run. In order to improve these gaps, some papers
use the panel cointegration technique by Pooled Mean Group to estimate the
long-run effect of the macroeconomic fundamentals on the EMBI+ (Ferrucci 2003;
Petrova et al. 2010; Poghosyan 2012). The Pooled Mean Group model is based on
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model by assuming the existence of long-
run equilibrium. The error correction coefficient must be negative and significant.
More detailed, Ferrucci 2003 tests 11 emerging countries from the period 1997 to
2002 in order to determine the short and long-run effects of the EMBI+, EMBI
Global. His work finds the external liquidity conditions that are important factor
of spreads market. Moreover, Petrova et al. 2010 try this method and fixed effect
for a panel of 14 emerging markets in a long period from 1997.Q1-2009.Q2. They
use two groups of explanatory variables: Macroeconomic variables referring to the
external debt/GDP 13, interest payments on external debt/reserves, short-term
debt/reserves, external debt amortization/reserves, fiscal balance/GDP, current
13. They use an interpolation technique in order to convert the annual external debt to quar-
terly data
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account balance/GDP, trade openness; Financial variables concerning the financial
stress index, risk-free rate, U.S. 3-month Treasury bill rate, 10-year government
bond yield, and volatility index VIX (see also Min 1998).
Rowland and Torres 2004 use the random-effects Generalized Least Squares
regression for a panel of 16 emerging markets from 1998 to 2002. They find
out that economic growth rate, debt-to-GDP ratio, reserves-to-GDP ratio and
debt-to-exports ratio are significant to explain the EMBI+ of the studied entities.
Furthermore, Gupta et al. 2008 explain the sovereign bond spreads by opting to
two-stage least squares and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for a panel of
30 emerging market economies from 1997 to 2007. Their paper highlights the fiscal
variables that are more essential and have a larger impact on EMBI. Jaramillo and
Tejada 2011 study the fixed effect for a panel of 35 emerging markets in the period
1997 to 2010 indicating the investment grade status reduces spreads by 36 percent
of bond spread.
In summary, the macroeconomic fundamentals long-run and short-run effects
on EMBI+ in these previous papers, are done without examining the asymmetric
effects (which effects are more important). Therefore, these gaps will open a path
of research in this dissertation.
We can see the summary of the principal empirical studies of the sovereign
default risk by using the technical econometric in Table 1.2:
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1.3.3 Sovereign default risk via the dynamic stochastic model
The last approach of sovereign default is shown by the dynamic stochastic
model & equilibrium model. This section focuses on reviewing some stochastic
models and equilibrium model on measuring and analysing the sovereign credit
spread with default policies.
There are several papers studying a small open economy under incomplete
market and microeconomics theory with relationship of sovereign income, sovereign
consumption and sovereign utility function. Alfaro and Kanczuk 2005 assume that
a representative borrowing sovereign being a function of sovereign’s preferences
function is 14: U = E
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct), where ct is consumption, u(c) =
c1−σ − 1
(1− σ) , σ > 0,
and this sovereign has two assets, one is stock of each type of debt and income of
the economy. Alfaro and Kanczuk 2005 present two types of country: "good 15"
and "bad" 16, and suppose that the capital and debt are fixed, country cannot
save or dis-save. They show that the existence of Markov perfect equilibrium
when "good sovereign" does not default after a bad shock. They also find that the
welfare is higher in equilibrium for which there is never default.
Alfaro and Kanczuk 2009 extend their model in 2005. They present a dynamic
14. See also in Arellano and Ramanarayanan 2012
15. "Good sovereign may or may not choose optimally to default on their international com-
mitmments"
16. "Bad sovereign are extremely impatient and choose to default at any time independently of
the state of the economy"
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equilibrium model to optimal reserve, and the role of exchange rate. They clarify
that the reserve accumulation does not play an important role, and the optimal
policy does not hold reverse at all. In addition, the interaction between fiscal
policy and sovereign risk appears in Cuadra et al. 2010; Hatchondo et al. 2012.
Yue 2010 creates a model with country’s preference to study sovereign default,
debt renegotiation, interest rates and debt recovery rates. Arellano 2008 studies
the interaction between GDP, consumption, foreign debt and interest spread. Yue
2010; Arellano 2008 prove the existence of default and debt reduction in equilib-
rium of incomplete market. Arellano 2008 assumes that the government chooses
to default and accepts to pay a default cost, and he demonstrates that the cost
of sovereign default is significant with default and hight interest rate. His results
illustrate that default probability and interest rate depend on the incentive for
repayment,i.e., default incentive. Eaton and Gersovitz 1981 show that the govern-
ment chooses to repay its debt because the default reputation would make it lose
the access to credit in the international market. Developing this idea, J. Bulow
and Rogoff 1989 study the default reputation that excludes from the international
market.
More specifically, Yue 2010 focuses on the debt recovery rate when a country
goes to default. In fact, when a country gets a bad shock, the government negoti-
ates and bargains with its lender to reduce its debt. She finds that the expected
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recovery rate is smaller according to debt renegotiation and decreases with indebt-
edness. Another important & interesting result: a lowly-indebted country may
choose not to default even when there is a debt renegotiation because the cost of
financial exclusion will be higher than the benefit of getting a debt reduction.
Arellano and Ramanarayanan 2012 show that a sovereign default occurs in
low-income, high-debt times, on the total outstanding debt in long term and short
term. The country will decide to optimize debt, maximize utility and focus on
maturity composition of debt. In their empirical analysis for Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, and Russia in the period March 1996 and May 2004, the authors conclude
that maturity of debt shortens in times of high spreads and downward-sloping
spread curves. They indicate that when spreads are initially low, governments will
issue long-term bonds more heavily and thus long-term spreads will be higher than
short-term spreads. When the spread rise, maturity of bond issuances shortens
and short-term spreads are higher than long-term spreads.
Several papers are based on the stochastic calculus, the Brownian movement
and American pricing option in order to improve some limitations in the structural
model.
Jeanneret 2008, 2013 generates daily sovereign credit spreads from endogenous
sovereign debt and default policies. The government receives income taxes from
the firms and uses them to repay its sovereign debt by assuming that the fiscal
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revenues of the government follow a stochastic process. The government defines the
optimal debt level and default policy, which maximize the sovereign wealth that
composes the present value of future fiscal revenue net of debt service plus incentive
for debt issuance. Default policy maximizes the value of the economy minus the
outstanding debt value. Sovereign default occurs when the sovereign fiscal revenues
fall below an endogenous default boundary that depends on economic, optimal debt
level. When default occurs, government and lenders will restructure the terms in
the debt contracts and agree to reduce a fraction of debt and reduce a fraction of
firm income level. His model explains the substantial daily variation in sovereign
credit spread while the availability of economic data is in quarter and annual
frequency.
Andrade 2009 uses also yield spreads on sovereign bonds, but the function of
yield spread on sovereign bond is different with other papers, because he uses stock
Price-Earnings (P/E) ratio and expected return as yield spread on sovereign bond.
In this model, he supposed an emerging country whose an endowment as stochastic
process and using specifies a kernel-pricing showed a measure of "country risk"
as a negative regime change that is with a hostile renegotiation of the country’s
foreign debt. The empirical result is calibrated on Brazilian data from January
1998 to December 2007 based on EMBI+. He finds that when the sovereign yield
spread increases, "the emerging market stocks tend to become more volatile in
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absolute terms, less volatile relative to sovereign bonds, and more correlated with
sovereign bonds" by validating the consistence between the model’s quantitative
and qualitative predictions.
1.4 Conclusion
This chapter aims at presenting an overview of the sovereign default history,
the causes of sovereign default, the default’s costs, and the different approaches of
sovereign default risk determinants.
We provided the knowledge of the sovereign default risk indicators and its
proxies; such as the sovereign default probability, sovereign CDS spread, sovereign
yield spread and Emerging Market Bond Index Plus. We highlighted theoretically
the three main models of sovereign default with empirical evidences: the structure
model, the dynamic stochastic model and the econometric models. We analysed
the advantages and limitations of each approach.
To start, the structure sovereign default model is based on the pricing option
and the sovereign balance sheet. The sovereign default risk is expressed by the
sovereign default probability indicator. However, one of the limitations of this
model is data availability, i.e., the data is only available on annual basis and for a
short period of time. Consequently, it is difficult to test statistically the significance
of the model. Hence, the structure model is only applied for Brazil and Turkey.
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Secondly, the dynamic stochastic model is used to modelling the economic
policies based on the stochastic calculus and the Brownian movement. Accordingly,
researchers model the sovereign credit spread or the sovereign yield spread based on
these policies, i.e., when the government encourages the trade to generate higher
revenues in order to reimburse their debt; or when the government decides to
issue the money, or when it negotiates to reduce debt. The aim of these models
is compare the estimated indicator with observed one in order to confirm the
consistency of the model.
Thirdly, the econometric models are most widely used in economic research field
in recent years. Among these models, we can disclose the following: Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM), Pooled Mean Group (PMG), Mean Group (MG) and
cointegration tests. In these models, we focused on reviewing the determinants of
sovereign CDS spread and EMBI+ by macroeconomic fundamentals which are
represented by government’s solvency, government’s liquidity and macroeconomic
situation.
Finally, this rich literatures suggest four propositions that will be explored in
the next chapters.
CHAPTER 2
A structural model of sovereign default risk: Evidence from
Argentina
2.1 Introduction
The volatility of the world economy is more complex and more difficult to
forecast. The collapse and chained bankruptcy of the financial system caused the
sovereign default of many countries that depends on strong currencies, like the U.S.
Dollar. In fact, the financial crisis in Thailand (1997) derived from the default of
large financial institutions and loss of its liquidity, together with the withdrawal
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of foreign investment in the country. In addition, globalization is one of the causes
that lead to contagion crisis in Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia and
Malaysia, followed by Russia and Latin American countries, for example, Brazil
(2002) and Argentina (2001). Consequently, public debt management has become
the first priority to stabilize the economy.
Credit risk models have been used in the lending activities of commercial banks.
The original structural models began with Merton’s credit risk model (Robert
C Merton 1974) based on the option pricing theory of Black and Scholes 1973.
The model allows calculating the value of a firm’s asset and asset volatility by
using information of firm’s liabilities on the firm’s balance sheet. This model is
also called Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA) model, and this was improved by
Black and Scholes 1973, Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), Kealhofer-Merton-Vasicek
(KMV,2000) and commercialized by Moody’s. This idea was transposed from firm
level to country level to calculate the sovereign asset value and sovereign asset
volatility. The sovereign default risk model was developed by Gray and Malone
2008 who use macroeconomic and the option pricing theory. More precisely, they
applied sovereign CCA balance sheet which interlinks balance sheet of government
and authorities. The sovereign default risk model has successfully been applied to
some emerging countries, such as Brazil (Gray et al. 2007; Gray and Malone 2008)
and Turkey (Souto et al. 2007).
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This chapter is organized as follows. In the second section of this chapter, we
review the Black & Scholes formula. In section 3, we present the Merton credit
risk model; in section 4, we explain how to transpose from credit risk to sovereign
default risk, and how to apply a sovereign CCA balance sheet model for emerging
countries. In the next section, we show an empirical result for the case of Argentina
for the period 1997-2009. We conclude in the last section.
2.2 The Black & Scholes Formula
In the trend of investment boom and globalization, the development of financial
instruments is considered as one of the five pillars of stable growth in the U.S.
economy. The new financial instruments on the financial market are derivative
financial instruments that not only allow banks to prevent risks but also make a
profit following arbitrage.
A derivative instrument is a contract between two parties that specifies con-
ditions (especially the dates, resulting values of the underlying variables, and no-
tional amounts) under which payments are to be made between the parties (Hull
2008).
One of those derivatives contracts is the option contract. This is a financial
contract between two parties, the buyer and the seller, that gives the buyer the
right, but not the obligation to buy/sell an underlying asset from the seller at a
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pre-determined price K, on or before pre-determined future time T . If the right is
valid on the date T , but not before is called a European option, otherwise if the
right is valid before the time T it is called an American option. In this chapter, we
will only use European options contracts. There are two types of option contract:
Call option and Put option.
The Black & Schole model is one of the fundamental concepts of modern fi-
nancial theory. Developed in 1973 by Black and Scholes 1973, it is considered
as a benchmark to determine the option price that has been used widely today.
In 1997, Merton and Schole received the Nobel Prize in economics. This model
includes the formula of Black & Scholes which gives the price of the European
option.
Merton analyzed security price dynamics and asset dynamics by using a stochas-
tic process where the stochastic process is a random process indexed by time. He
used continuous time to price the security price/asset dynamic. There are two prin-
cipal stochastic processes in continuous time that we use in this chapter: Brownian
motion and Itô’s process. Brownian motion is a stochastic process where the value
of the stock may be positive or negative. Indeed, we have a variable X that follows
a Brownian motion with expected rate of return (drift) µ and volatility σ given
by: dX = µdt+ σdW
The second one is an Itô’s process of X variable given by : dX = µ(t,X)dt +
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σ(t,X)dW . We have Itô’s lemma of a function f(t,X) 1 by:
df(t,X) = [
∂f
∂t
+
∂f
∂X
µ(t,X) +
∂2f
∂X2
σ2(t,X)]dt+
∂f
∂X
σ(t,X)dW (2.1)
where dW is a Brownian process.
If µ(t,X) = µX and σ(t,X) = σX then the function df(t,X) in equation (2.1)
becomes dX/X = µdt + σdW , this new function is named Geometric Brownian
Motion (GBM). Therefore, the value of the underlying asset dynamics describes a
GBM.
The Call option is one of three assets dynamics with risk-free interest rate and
underlying risky asset in the continuous-time market, and the Call option follows
an Ito’s lemma process.
For an option pricing contract, R. C. Merton 1990 used several assumptions:
— There is a perfect market
— There is no transaction cost, tax.
— All participants in the market can lend and borrow at the same risk-free
rate; This risk-free rate is exogenous and constant during the life cycle
of the option.
— There exists a sufficient number of investors; each investor believes that
he can buy and sell assets at the desired amount.
1. f(t,X) is at least twice differentiable in X and one differentiable in t
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— It allows short-selling 2 of all assets
— There is no arbitrage opportunities (without risk).
— With an instantaneous risk-free rate r at any period, the price of a risk-free
discount bond paying one dollar at time T in the future is p(T ) = exp(−rT ).
— The trading of the securities is continuous.
— The value of the underlying asset follows a GBM written by: dA = µAdt+
σAdW ; where: A is value of the underlying asset; µ is a drift; σ is volatility
of the underlying asset; dW is a standard Gauss-Wiener process.
Under these assumptions, we review the Call, Put formula:
The Call option is a financial contract which gives the buyer the right, not the
obligation, to purchase a security at a pre-determined price (strike price) K on the
future date T . In return, the buyer is required to pay the seller a fee that is called
call premium (p). The buyer of the Call option hopes that the price of underlying
asset will rise in the future. If the stock price rises as expected, then the buyer
will exercise this contract, since he has invested only a small fee. Otherwise, if
the stock price is below the price K, we do not exercise the Call option contract
because the pay-off is negative. The pay-off of a Call option is: max(0, A − K)
where A is the value of the underlying asset at the time T .
2. short-selling is the practice of selling borrowed securities when securities price down, hope
that the price will down so that borrower can buy it back at a lower price to return the borrower
to the lender.
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We have the equation for the Call option price:
C = AN (d1)−Ke−rT ∗ N (d2)
where d1 =
Ln(A
K
) + (r + 0, 5σ2)T
σ
√
T
and d2 = d1 − σ
√
T ; N is the cumulative
standard normal distribution, r is a continuous risk-free interest rate, σ is volatility
of the underlying asset, T is time.
We can see in Figure 2.1 below that: when the stock price fluctuates from 0 to
K, the buyer does not exercise the Call option contract. The graph is represented
by a line that is parallel with the horizontal axis from 0 to K. When the price is
greater than K, the buyer will exercise a Call option contract. In this case, the
graph is represented by the 45 degree line.
The put option is a financial contract that gives the buyer the right, not the
obligation to sell a security at a pre-determined price (strike price) K on the future
date T . In return, the buyer is required to pay the seller a fee that is called put
premium (p). The buyer of the put option hopes that the price of the underlying
asset will fall in the future. If the stock price falls as expected, then the buyer
will exercise this contract, the buyer will benefit as he has to invest a small fee.
Otherwise, if the stock price is greater than the prices K, we don’t exercise the
put option contract because the pay-off is negative. The pay-off of a put option
is: max(0, K − A) where A is the value of underlying asset at the time T .
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We have the equation for the put option price:
P = −AN (d1) +Ke−rT ∗ N (d2)
where d1 =
Ln(A
K
) + (r + 0, 5σ2)T
σ
√
T
and d2 = d1 − σ
√
T ; N is cumulative stan-
dard normal distribution, r is continuous risk-free interest rate, µ is volatility of
underlying asset, T is time.
In Figure 2.1 below: when the stock price fluctuates from 0 to K, the buyer
exercises the put option contract, the graph line is represented by the 45 degree
line. When the price is greater than K, then the buyer will not exercise put option
contract, the graph is represented by the parallel line with the horizontal axis from
0 to K.
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Figure 2.1: Profit of buyer/seller for Call/Put option
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2.3 The credit risk model
Credit risk is a popular term which is used in the banking and finance sector.
In fact, one of the main activities of commercial banks is lending activities which
have always a credit risk. Credit risk is a risk in which a borrower will have no
capacity to pay-off his debt at maturity. Default occurs when a debtor does not
pay his debt at maturity. Or we can understand that debt default occurs when
the borrower has not made a scheduled payment of interest or principal. Hence,
the banks want to protect themselves against credit risk, so that they require
generally that the borrower has a collateral asset (housing, stocks...) in order to
access the credit market. At maturity, if the borrower does not pay-off its debt,
the banks will process collateral assets for payment of debts. Thus, credit risk is
an important factor we have to understand strongly. Simultaneously, banks might
analyse, evaluate, manage this type of risk to avoid loss of liquidity and its default.
A powerful model to evaluate default risk is Merton’s structural model (Robert
C Merton 1974). This model was developed from assumptions of option pricing
of Black and Schole (1973) described in the first section. Merton’s model is based
on the option pricing theory of Black and Scholes 1973 to explain the relationship
between equity value and derivative option (Put, Call). The purpose of Merton’s
model is to quantify the asset value and asset volatility by using information on
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debt and equity, so that we can determine the probability of default of loans.
The Merton model for credit risk has two steps:
— Firstly, the Black & Scholes’ equation for an European Call option is applied
to estimate the value of equity.
— Secondly, the firm’s equity is to estimate asset value and asset volatility.
Firstly: the Black & Scholes’ equation for an European Call option is applied
to estimate the value of equity.
This model is based on corporate balance sheet and structural capital. Suppose
at time T , a firm has an asset AT that is financed by equity ET and zero-coupon
debtDT . The capital structure represents by the following formula: AT = ET +DT
Asset Liabilities
AT Equity ET
Zero-coupon debt DT
Table 2.1: Firm’s balance sheet
In the Merton model, he supposed that the market value of the firm’s asset
dynamics AT follows the GBM:
dA = rAdt+ σAAdW (2.2)
or
dA
A
= rdt+ σAdW
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where: A, dA are respectively the firm’s asset value and the change of asset
value; µA, σA are the expected rate of return of the firm’s asset value and its
volatility; dW is a Wiener process.
In the original Merton’s model, the default risk appears when the asset value
(AT ) falls below the face value of all debt (DT ) at maturity (T = 1). A strong
assumption of this model is that default only occurs at maturity. This assumption
is like as a characteristic of zero-coupon bond where the investor receives one
payment at maturity. The face value of all debt represents the promised payments
of the debt. At maturity T , the firm will pay-off its debt, and there are 2 situations:
— If AT < DT , the asset of this firm is not sufficient to payoff its debt, so this
firm will default at time T .
— If AT ≥ DT , the firm will pay-off its debt to creditors at time T . The value
of equity equals to assets minus debt, otherwise the equity value is equal to
zero. The value of equity can be written as ET = max(AT −DT , 0).
This formula is related to the European Call option contracts and is the first
step of Merton model. Indeed, we can explain this as follows: creditors hold a bond
issued by a firm, we can assume that creditors have the right, not the obligation,
to receive the bond of this firm. Applying option pricing theory, we exercise a
Call option if the value of the firm’s asset is greater than value of total debt (total
debt is the strike price), otherwise if the value of a firm’s asset is below the value
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of total debt, we will not exercise a Call option. So, the equity value (E) can be
interpreted exactly as a Call option.
The value of Call price for equity is computed as:
E = AN (d1)−De−rT ∗ N (d2) (2.3)
Where d1 =
Ln(A
D
) + (r + 0, 5σ2)(T )
σ
√
T
; d2 = d1 − σ
√
T ; A is the firm’s asset
value, D is total debt, r risk-free interest rate, σ is the firm’s asset volatility, T is
maturity.
Secondly: the firm’s equity is to estimate the asset value and asset volatility.
We can apply the Itô’s lemma for the Call price dynamics C(t, A) on the value
of firm’s asset A:
dC(t, A) = [
∂C
∂t
+
∂C
∂A
µAA+
∂2C
∂A2
σ2AA]dt+
∂C
∂A
σAAdW (2.4)
The dynamics for equity follows a GBM process:
dE = µEEdt+ σEEdW (2.5)
According to Black & Scholes equation, the delta for a Call is given by:
∆ =
∂C
∂A
= N (d1) (2.6)
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where d1 =
Ln(A
D
) + (r + 0, 5σ2)T
σ
√
T
Because we can consider the equity as a Call option, we combine formulas
(2.4),(2.5),(2.6) for the standard Gauss-Wiener process dW factor to obtain:
σEE = N (d1)σAA (2.7)
The outputs of this model find the implicit firm’s asset value A and the firm’s
asset volatility σA by using 2 equation (2.3),(2.7). In these two equations, we know
the equity value E, equity volatility σE , debt value D, interest rate r and maturity
T . 
E = AN (d1)−De−rT ∗ N (d2)
σEE = N (d1)σAA
Default Probability
From equation (2.2), the process of asset AT at the time T can be calculated
from the asset value at time 0, is written by:
AT = A0 exp[(r − 0, 5σ2A)T + σAε
√
T ] (2.8)
where ε is the random component of a normal random variable N (0, 1).
The probability of default occurs when the firm’s asset value AT is less than
debt value DT at maturity T . The debt value is the promised payments value that
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are the present value of the debts discounted at the risk-free rate.
The probability of default under the neutral-risk P is given by:
P(AT < DT ) ≡ P (lnAT < lnDT )
we have:
ln(AT ) = ln(A0) + (r − 0, 5σ2A)T + σAε
√
T
P(lnAT < lnDT ) = Pr(ln(A0) + (r − 0, 5σ2A)T + σAε
√
T < lnDT )
= P(−Ln(
A0
DT
) + (r − 0, 5σ2)T
σ
√
T
> ε)
= P(−d2,r > ε)
where d2,r =
Ln(A0
Dt
) + (r − 0, 5σ2)T
σ
√
T
Because the random component is normally distributed, ε ∼ N (0, 1), compar-
ing with the above result, we can define the probability of default equal to value
of N (−d2r).
For example:
Assuming that if we know the firm’s equity value E=27.140 $; D=393.835 $;
σE = 0.254 risk-free rate r = 5 %, T = 1. So we have four equations:
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
27.140 = AN (d1)− 393.835e−0.05 ∗ N (d2)
27.140 ∗ 0.254 = N (d1)σAA
d1 =
Ln( A
393.835
) + (0.05 + 0.5σ2A)
σA
d2 = d1 − σA
We find the firm’s asset value A= 401.7674 $, σA = 0.2565 and d2 = 0.573;
The default probability of this firm: N (−d2r) = 44.2582 %.
2.3.1 The variation of default probability
In this section, we present the variation of default probability (DP) when dis-
tress barrier, risk-free rate, maturity vary.
We can see in Table (2.2), (2.3),(2.4): I set a fixed asset value equal to 100 $;
the distress barrier fluctuates from a very low value (9 $) to a very high value (99
$); risk-free risk varies from 5 % to 20 %; maturity varies from 1 year to 10 year.
V D r σV T d2 DP
100 75 0.05 0.4 1 0.6442 25.9721 %
100 75 0.05 0.4 5 0.1539 43.8831 %
100 75 0.05 0.4 10 -0.0097 50.3884 %
100 75 0.1 0.4 1 0.7692 22.0885 %
100 75 0.2 0.4 1 1.0192 15.4059 %
Table 2.2: Case 1: increasing r and T
The variation of default probability depends on the variation of the variable
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V D r σV T d2 DP
100 99 0.05 0.4 1 -0.0498 51.9888 %
100 99 0.05 0.4 5 -0.1564 56.2168 %
100 99 0.05 0.4 10 -0.2292 59.0653 %
Table 2.3: Case 2: increasing D and T
V D r σV T d2 DP
100 9 0.05 0.4 1 5.9448 1.38343E-07 (≈ 0) %
100 9 0.05 0.4 5 2.5244 0.5793 %
100 9 0.05 0.4 10 1.6664 4.7809 %
100 9 0.05 0.4 20 1.0106 15.609 %
Table 2.4: Case 3: decreasing D and increasing T
d2.
We can resume the variation default probability in below:
— If DT increases/decreases then DP will increase/decrease respectively.
— If A0 increases/decreases then DP will decrease/increase respectively.
— If σA increases/decreases then DP will increase/decrease respectively.
— If T increases/decreases then DP will increase/decrease respectively.
— If r increases/decreases then DP will decrease/increase respectively.
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2.3.2 Risk-neutral default probability and Actual default
probability
In order to obtain the default probability under the actual risk Q, we replace
the neutral-risk interest rate value r by actual interest rate value µ.
Q(AT < DT ) = N (−d2µ) = N (−d2 − ρA,MS
√
T ) (2.9)
where: ρA,M is correlation of implicit asset return and stock market return, S is
Sharpe ratio.
The risk-neutral and actual default probability have concern with the risk-
neutral expected return and actual expected return respectively. The risk-neutral
expected return is a world where all investor/assets been risk-neutral. On the other
side, the actual expected return is a real world. Evidently, the actual expected
return is greater than the risk-neutral expected return, i.e., we argue that the
investor does not want to invest for a risky asset if the expected return of this
asset is less than the risk-neutral expected return.
The Girsanov 1960’s theorem presented how to measure and to compare the
risk-neutral default probability and actual default probability. According to this
theorem, the risk-neutral default probability is greater than actual DP because
the expected return µ greater than r (Gray and Malone 2008).
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2.4 The structural sovereign default risk model
2.4.1 Motivation
From the financial crisis in Thailand (1997) with the collapse of the Baht 3,
especially many credit institutions went bankrupt. This collapse led to deprecia-
tion of the value of local currency of Korea, Indonesia. Through oil, Russia was
the next victim of the financial crisis: Russian currency was devalued and Russia
announced its default and denied to pay its government debt to creditors. Facing
with this situation, Brazil raised interest rates to 40 % in order to keep capital
flow, but this scenario could not save Brazil out of the crisis 4. Because these coun-
tries held a very large amount of U.S. government bonds, the sovereign default of
emerging countries led to the decline of the world economic system. Therefore,
measuring the sovereign default probability is very essential.
The idea of transposing Merton’s model from the firm to the sovereign is to
consider that the sovereign has two types of debts: a debt in local currency (for
example, bills emitted by the central bank) and a debt in foreign currency. The
government will always pay-off at first the debt in foreign currency, and the debt
in local currency will only be paid-off if there is enough money.
Theoretically, the central bank will be able to create money to pay its govern-
3. Baht is the currency of Thailand
4. see Friedman 1999
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ment debts in local currency. However, this way would stimulate inflation and is
opposed to the goal of stabilizing the economy. As a consequence, harmonizing
between the debt repayment schedule and economic stability is a difficult task for
macroeconomic policy-makers.
The inputs data in Gray et al. 2007; Gray and Malone 2008 were 5-year US
Swap rates as the risk-free rate, 5-year maturity, monetary base, local currency
debt and foreign currency debt for an empirical case of Brazil. The output of their
model showed that the Brazil’s sovereign asset value arrives the default point in
the Brazil’s crisis period 2002-2003, and the Brazil’s risk indicator had a high cor-
relation with its sovereign spread. This result illustrated clearly the real Brazilian
economy.
Souto et al. 2007 used the volatility value of forward exchange rate as implied
volatility from FX-option. The principal objective is to find the loan losses value
of the main economic sectors for Turkey by means of using the CCA model. They
created some scenarios to find the change of sovereign asset value and its volatility
on condition that economic indicators shift, such as the change of exchange rate,
risk-free interest rate or stock market index.
The purpose of this section, is to bring some extensions of the Merton model,
advanced by Gray and Malone 2008. That is a framework to compute the sovereign
asset value and the sovereign asset volatility of emerging countries based on the
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option pricing theory by using information on sovereign liabilities.
2.4.2 Assumptions of the model
We consider an economy as a set of three interrelated sectors: the financial
sector (banks), the non-financial (household and firms) and the sovereign sector
(the combination between the government and monetary authority, also called the
public sector). The extension of the Merton model is how to calculate the implicit
sovereign asset value and its volatility.
The sovereign asset value is an unobservable variable because we cannot aggre-
gate asset value of all components in the economy. In the actual market, only a
few components can be observed; therefore, the aggregate value of all assets is not
really easy to work with. The extension of Gray and Malone 2008 determined im-
plicit sovereign asset and sovereign asset volatility by using the observed sovereign
liabilities based on sovereign balance sheet.
There are three main assumptions in the extension of the Merton model:
— Assets follow a stochastic GBM process.
— The values of liabilities are derived from assets.
— Liabilities have a priority of debt: senior and junior. Foreign-currency debt
is senior debt and this debt will be priority pay-off to creditors. Domestic-
currency debt is junior debt that will be payed-off to creditors after the
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finishing payment of foreign-currency debt. For European countries (who
use a common currency, the Euro), the debt is also usually in Euros, or
strong currencies like the US Dollar, so it does not have a priority of debt.
Therefore, this assumption imposes a limitation to the model when applied
to European countries.
The sovereign balance sheet has two sides: assets and liabilities. The asset of
monetary authorities include foreign reserves, credit to the government and others.
The liabilities of monetary authorities are the monetary base, financial guarantees
to the government, including guarantees to supply foreign currency to service the
sovereign foreign-currency-denominated debt. The assets of the government are:
net fiscal assets (including the seigniorage-tax inflation) and others. The liabilities
of government are: credit to monetary authorities (including local currency debt
held by the monetary authorities) and local currency debt held outside of the
government and monetary authorities ... To simplify the model, we show the
sovereign balance sheet:
Sovereign Assets Sovereign Liabilities
Foreign-currency debt
Domestic currency debt + Monetary base
Table 2.5: Sovereign balance sheet
Sovereign liabilities are combined by two factors: foreign-currency debt and
sum of domestic currency debt and monetary base. Foreign-currency debt is the
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debt of the public sector in foreign currency held by foreigners. Domestic currency
debt is the debt of the public sector in domestic currency held by the private sector.
The monetary base consists of currency in circulation, bank reserves (required bank
reserves, excess reserves, vault cash). In banking, excess reserves are bank reserves
in excess of the reserve requirement set by a central bank. They are reserves of cash
in excess of the required amounts. Changes in base money correspond to changes
in net foreign assets and net domestic assets. Governments borrow by issuing
securities, government bonds (long-term) and bills (short term) or borrow directly
from World Bank, IMF. The local-currency debt of the public sector is the debt
that held by private sector (Gray and Malone 2008). The foreign-currency debt of
the public sector is held usually primarily by foreigners. But according to Panizza
2008, there are 2 approaches to determine external debt/internal debt. The first
one is focused on currency of debt issued, i.e., foreign-currency debt is considered
external debt, and local-currency debt is internal debt. But this approach has a
problem. Actually, there are some countries issued the foreign-currency debt in
the internal market and issued domestic-currency debt in the international market.
The second one is focused on the residence of the creditor, i.e., foreign-currency
debt comes from non-residents debt. Primarily, the statistical information officially
of external debt is based on the second approach.
In this section, we consider the foreign-currency debt that comes from non-
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residents and domestic-currency debt from the residents.
The sum of domestic currency debt and the monetary base is considered as
"sovereign equity (SE)" and foreign currency debt is considered as sovereign risky
debt. We refer to "foreign currency debt" as "risky debt" because the foreign
debt is influenced by the exchange rate, i.e., more precisely, if the exchange rate
between strong currency and domestic currency increases, which means that the
amount of foreign debt increases, and in a worst case scenario, this country loses
the ability to pay-off his foreign debt.
2.4.3 Definition
Sovereign default and default barrier
Sovereign default occurs when the values of sovereign assets fall below contrac-
tual liabilities also known as sovereign default barrier (named sovereign distress
barrier or default threshold).
At a sovereign level, the distress barrier approach is different than the one in
the original Merton model. In the original Merton model, the distress barrier is
the firm’s total debt. This means that a firm will default when the value of firm’s
asset is below the value of total debt. KMV model is based on the Merton model
but with adjustments: the debt consists of short-term obligations and long-term
debt. A firm has more time to recover with respect to the long-term debt. KMV’s
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research led it to conclude that the distress barrier is really somewhere in between
the short-term debt and the total debt. The default barrier is the face value 5 that
will affect the pay-off in one year (Crosbie and R.Bohn 2001).
De Servigny and Renault 2007 used the ratio between long term foreign cur-
rency debt (DebtLT ) and short term foreign currency debt (DebtST ) to define the
default barrier. If the ratio of long term foreign-currency debt divided by short
term foreign-currency debt is less than 1.5 then default barrier =DebtST + 0.5 ∗
DebtLT + one year interest payment. Otherwise, default barrier = DebtST +
DebtLT ∗ (0, 7− 0, 3 ∗DebtST/DebtLT ).
In many cases, the default barrier was defined by the sum of short term foreign
debt plus a portion (varied from 0.5 to 0.8) of long term foreign debt. In this
research, we define the default barrier as the sum of short term foreign currency
debt plus a half long term foreign currency debt.
Implicit sovereign asset and sovereign asset volatility
The Gray et al.’s model calculates the implicit sovereign asset (SA) and the
sovereign asset volatility based on the sovereign liabilities. The sum of domestic
currency debt and the monetary base is called "sovereign equity"(SE), and foreign
currency debt is considered risky sovereign debt.
Likewise with the credit risk model, the "sovereign equity" value can be mod-
elled as an implicit Call option, and sovereign risky debt is modelled as the default-
5. The "outstanding debt" may be used instead of a "face value"
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free value of debt minus an implicit Put option, by using equation (2.3) and (2.7).
The first equation
The call value for the SE is computed by:
SE$ = SA$N (d1)−Dfe−rfT ∗ N (d2) (2.10)
where d1 =
ln(SA$
Df
) + (rf + 0, 5σ
2
SA)T
σSA
√
T
and d2 = d1−σ
√
T ; SA$ is the sovereign as-
set value, Df is default barrier, rf is risk-free foreign interest rate, σSA is sovereign
asset volatility, T is maturity.
The second equation
We apply Itô’s lemma to call-option formula to derive a formula for the equity
volatility: (Ito’s lemma to calculate volatility of the process SE)
SE ∗ σSE,$ = N (d1) ∗ σSA ∗ SA$ (2.11)
where d1 =
ln(SA$
Df
) + (rf + 0, 5σ
2
SA)T
σv
√
T
and d2 = d1−σ
√
T ; SA$, σSA are sovereign
assets value and sovereign asset volatility in foreign-currency.
One assumptions of Black & Scholes model is that there exists constant risk-
free interest rate. But there is no clear market of risk-free interest rate. We have
two possible of risk-free interest rates: the zero-coupon Treasury rates 10-year and
swap rates. There are some recommendations of risk-free interest rate:
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— Zhu 2006 used 5 year-US Swap rates as the risk-free rate and a 5-year time
horizon for his analysis.
— Datastream recommended 3 month Treasury bills as risk-free interest rate.
— Bloomberg uses 10 year government bond rates as the risk-free interest rate.
In two main equations, there are two variables of risk-free interest rate: foreign
interest rate and domestic interest rate. By default in this research, we define the
foreign interest rate as a risk-free interest rate of US and domestic interest rate is
risk-free interest rate of emerging countries.
We combine equations (2.10) and (2.11) to find the sovereign asset value SA$
and sovereign asset volatility σSA and then the sovereign default probability.
Probability of sovereign default under neutral risk is : P = N (−d2r).
Probability of sovereign default under actual risk is : Q = N (−d2µ) = N (−d2−
ρA,MS
√
T )
2.5 Empirical evidence from Argentina
2.5.1 Background of Argentina’s economy
Argentina’s crisis 1999-2002 and its debt default in 2001 were a serious crisis
that damaged strongly the economy of this country. The overview of the Argentina
economy can be considered in three factors: inflation rate, exchange rate and debt
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default. We can observe Figure 2.2(a) of inflation rate in the period 1975-2001:
hyperinflation rate was 335% per year from 1975. Then, it maintained at the level
of 10% and 20% per month during the next years, and peaked to 688% in 1984.
Especially, in 1989, the inflation rate rocketed up to 3000%. By contrast, in 1997
it had dropped to 0.3%, and in 2001 it was negative (-1.5%).
3500
3000
2000
2500
1500
1000
0
500
‐500 1 9
7
5
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
Argentina's Annual Inflation Rate
4
3
3,5
2,5
1,5
2
1
0
0,5
Argentina's official exchange rate 
(a) (b)
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses and World Bank correspond to (a), (b) respectively
Figure 2.2: Argentina’s annual inflation rate (%) and exchange rate
As shown in Figure 2.2(b), from 1997 to 2001, the exchange rate of Argentina
currencies kept the regime of fixed exchange rate one-to-one Argentina peso-dollar
(0.9995) but by early 2002 it jumped to 3%. This event marked the end of this
regime. In 2002, a policy for all banks was to convert all bank accounts denomi-
nated in dollars to pesos at the floating exchange rate. From 2001 to 2009, after
finishing the regime of fixed exchange rate, the peso became devalued.
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When reducing the budget deficit during the crisis 1999-2001, unfortunately,
Argentina had to face failures repeatedly. So that it might burden a large foreign
debt and the surged public debt displayed by a rapid increase of government debt.
Particularly, the public debt ratio exceeded the allowed rate of 50% GDP in the
end of 1999. In 2001, the amount of debt default in the total public debt went up
to 80 billions $. And this number marked the event of Argentina’s default in this
year (see in Figure 2.3 below).
Figure 2.3: Argentina’s total defaulted debt (Source: Moody’s, * since 1983)
2.5.2 Application CCA method to Argentina
Data sources
The data used in this study comes from many sources: The debt public in
domestic currency is from MECON (Ministerio de Economia y production, Re-
public of Argentina), the external debt is taken from INDEC (National Institute
of Statistic and Censuses, Argentina), Central Bank of Argentina (CBA).
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Figure 2.4: Argentina’s input data
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Empirical results
In this study, we use an annual database for the period 1997-2009 for the
following variables: interest rate 10-year of Government United States as the risk-
free foreign interest rate, external debt, public debt monetary base in local currency
and assume one year of maturity. We simply apply the official exchange rate to
convert the value of the monetary base, public debt in local currency to foreign
currency. For the default distress, we define the default barrier equal to the sum
of external debt in the short term plus half of long term external debt. In order
to find volatility of sovereign equity, we use the historical volatility method.
The main purpose in this section is to calculate the risk-neutral DP and the
actual DP for Argentina by using the structural model of Gray et al. 2007; Gray and
Malone 2008 and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) respectively. Following
these results, we show the evolution of two curves of DP with Argentina’s situation.
In addition, we verify these findings with the Girsanov’s theorem.
The risk-neutral default probability is applied by the structural model of
Gray et al. 2007; Gray and Malone 2008. The outputs also are the sovereign asset
value and its volatility.
The actual default probability is calculated by the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM). We recall equation (2.9):
N (−d2µ) = N (−d2 − ρA,MS
√
T )
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In order to find two values of ρA,M and Sharpe ratio 6, we apply the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to find ρA,M .
E(Ri)− rd = βi(E(Rm)− rd)
Where: E(Ri) is the expected return on the Argentina’s sovereign asset, rd
is Argentina’s yield government bond, βi is the sensitivity of the expected excess
sovereign asset return to the expected excess market return, E(Rm) is expected
return on the Argentina stock market.
We propose the Merval Index 7 as the Argentina’s stock market index. By
using the Merval index return and Argentina’s sovereign asset return, we obtain
the correlation value between the Merval index return and sovereign asset return.
The results obtained can see in Figure 2.5: the line graph shows figures for the
comparison between the Argentina’s sovereign asset and its default barrier, the
sovereign asset (left axis) and its volatility (right axis), risk-neutral default prob-
ability and actual default probability, the distance-to-default and the Argentina’s
EMBI+.
As shown in Figure 2.5: The first graph shows the evolution between the Ar-
gentina’s sovereign asset and its default barrier between the years 1997 and 2009.
From 1997 to 2001, they had a noticeable decrease. Furthermore, the distance
6. Sharpe ratio = Average of excess return/Standard Deviation of excess return
7. Merval Index is the most important index of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange
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between the two lines in this period is more and more smaller. This means that
the Argentina’s default probability had a slight increase. This was explained by
that the more the ratio of Argentina’s sovereign asset to its default barrier in-
creased, the more Argentina’s default probability increased. At the end of 2001,
the Argentina’s sovereign asset reached to the distress barrier, i.e., in that year,
Argentina had a default of 80 billion USD of external debt. In 2005, the ratio of
Argentina’s sovereign asset to its distress barrier was 1.3 while in 2008, this ratio
was 1.7. Therefore, from 2002, there was a raise of the distance of the Argentina’s
sovereign asset and its default barrier. This reveals a decrease of the Argentina’s
default probability.
The second one is an important output that illustrates Argentina’s implied
sovereign asset and degree distribution of its implied volatility. These results
suggest the sovereign asset and its implied volatility tended to decline from the
beginning of 1998 to 2002, and both rose after 2002 that is exactly the period
where Argentina’s default occurred.
The third one compares Argentina’s risk-neutral default probability and actual
default probability. These plots confirm the Girsanov 1960’s theorem that the risk-
neutral default probability is greater than the actual one. The evolution showed
the DP go up strongly until 2001 and go down in post-period of 2001. In fact, this
decline is thankful to Argentina improved policies of the post-crisis.
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Regarding the lines graph between the sovereign default probability in Figure
2.5 and the Argentina’s inflation rate in Figure 2.4, these results also indicate
both have the same evolution with Argentina’s economic situation. Therefore, we
conclude the default probability obtained from the model which very homogeneous
with Argentinian economy.
The last one display the correlation between the distance-to-default and the
Argentina’s EMBI+ in order to validate the model. We compute the distance-to-
default (DD):
DD =
SA−Df
SA ∗ σSA (2.12)
Gapen et al. 2008 argue that the distance-to-default is inverse related to the
sovereign default probability, and it should be negatively correlated with the
EMBI+ spread or the sovereign CDS spread 8, i.e. when the distance-to-default
decreases, the sovereign default probability will increase. The correction coefficient
between the Argentina’s DD and the EMBI+ is -0.213** significant at 5% level,
confirming the model is validated.
8. The Argentina’s CDS spread database is available from 2007. Therefore, we use the EMBI+
for this estimation
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows the overview of the option pricing: Put and Call of the
European option and its application for the credit risk model in order to calculate
the default probability. The first objective of this chapter is to demonstrate and
to show the Merton’s model by re-establishing the Ito’s lemma and the option
pricing theory. According to the Merton’s model, the default occurs when value
of asset falls below the face value of all debt at maturity. Applying the option
pricing theory, the difference between the asset and debt is the equity value that
can be interpreted exactly as a Call option. From equation of Call option, we can
find the default probability.
Based on the credit risk model and how to apply the Call option to calculate
the default probability, we opted the idea of transposing Merton’s model from the
firm to the sovereign by Gray et al. 2007; Gray and Malone 2008. The hypothesis
is to consider that the sovereign has two types of debts: a debt in local currency
and one in foreign currency. The central variable is the sovereign equity that is the
sum of the monetary base plus the domestic debt. Likewise, we could interpreted
the sovereign equity as a Call European option, and we applied to calculate the
sovereign asset, its volatility and its default probability.
The main purpose was to verify a case study of Argentina’s default in 2002.
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Our results show the Argentina’s default probability tended to accelerate and reach
a top in 2002 and decelerate after 2002. This mean that it is consistent with the
Argentina’s situation. Conclusively, this contribution adds an empirical result of
the structure model based on the extensions of Gray et al. 2007; Gray and Malone
2008 which have confirmed exactly with the real Argentinian economy.
Furthermore, the demonstrations of Ito’s lemma and the option pricing theory
will be useful for the stochastic calculation in the third chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
A stochastic model of sovereign credit spread
3.1 Introduction
Economic crises emerged widespread, notably in emerging countries. The Mex-
ican financial crisis (1994), the Asian crisis spreading from Thailand (1997) and
the Russian debt crisis (1998) were all due to political crises and bad executive
policies. Especially during the early 2000s, the failure of regulation and risk man-
agement led to crises in the emerging countries, as exemplified by the Turkish
currency devaluation in 2000, Argentina default in 2001 and Brazil crisis in 2002...
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The most striking example of such a failure being the global crisis arising from the
2007 subprimes deflagration.
This context of repeated crises and recurrent financial instability brought mea-
surement of sovereign risk to the fore as a key stake for policy-makers and regu-
lators. Many indicators of country risk have been used recently such as sovereign
credit ratings, default probability, sovereign credit spread, sovereign credit default
swap spread (sovereign CDS spread) and sovereign bond...
In this chapter, we focus on the sovereign credit spread, which is the differential
between yields on risky debt and those on what might be considered risk-free
government bonds (Remolona et al. 2007). It is presented in a dynamic stochastic
equilibrium model. Eaton and Gersovitz 1981 show that the government chooses
to repay its debt because the impact of default on reputation will degrade the
access to credit on the international market. In support of the latter argument J.
Bulow and Rogoff 1989 study the exclusion from the international market due to
default reputation. In reality, although many emerging countries were downgraded
and defaulted on their debt, foreign investors have come back after the government
has revived the economy and stabilised economic growth, eg: Argentina, Mexico,
Russia, Malaysia, Ecuador. Malaysia and Ecuador are two typical examples of
such a return of investors after a period of turmoil and a default on their debt.
Thus, what really matters for investors are the fundamentals like macroeconomic
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stability while the default reputation is a thing one very easily forget.
Yue 2010 studies the role of renegotiation when the sovereign defaults takes
place, and presents the bargaining power in reducing debt if the government does
not have the capacity to repay. In addition, Andrade 2009 focuses on the asset
pricing and renegotiation of sovereign debt when a country has negative economic
growth and a bad endowment shock. Agreeing with the choice to default, the
government accepts to pay the default cost. The default cost is mentioned in the
work of Borensztein and Panizza 2008; Arellano 2008; Andrade and Chhaochharia
2011. There are some default models of reserve optimisation, such as Ben-Bassat
and Gottlieb 1992; Alfaro and Kanczuk 2009. The interaction between fiscal policy
and sovereign risk appears in Cuadra et al. 2010; Hatchondo et al. 2012. In
the paper of Andrade 2009, the author creates a yield spread on sovereign bond
by using two ratios of Price-Earnings (P/E) and expected return. His model
suggests that the P/E ratio of an emerging market stock decreases with the average
sovereign yield spread, and that the valuation discount of stock price increases with
the average sovereign yield spread. Besides, Jeanneret 2013 studies the dynamic
sovereign credit risk model by finding the sovereign credit spread. His model
indicates that when the sovereign defaults, the government will be incited to issue
debt and to negotiate with its lenders to reduce its debt. The empirical results of
this paper for the period 2000-2011 derive from two groups: a first one is emerging
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countries and the second one is European countries.
In this paper, we propose an enhanced version of Jeanneret 2013 model. Our
model allows for two parallel policies: the government can choose between increas-
ing corporate tax and negotiating a reduction in its debt. The major contribution
of this work is to suggest a method determinating the sovereign credit spread
while accounting for the two kind of policies. Empirical investigations are lead
using daily data for four emerging countries, namely Brazil, Mexico, Peru and
Turkey, for the period 2000-2011.
The following section introduces the model and section 3 is devoted to the
empirical investigation. The Last section concludes.
3.2 Model
We suppose that a country consists of a government and a representative firm.
The firm asset, Vt, is represented by its income and follows a Geometric Brownian
Motion (GBM) with a drift µ and volatility σ:
dVt = µ(1− τ −∆)Vtdt+ σ(1− τ −∆)VtdW (3.1)
where W is a Brownian motion, ∆ ≥ 0.
The constant tax rate of the firm income by the government is τ . Thus, the
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government’s fiscal revenue at the time t is τVt, and the net firm’s asset is (1−τ)Vt.
The government pays a perpetual debt service C to its lenders.
The government defaults when sovereign asset Vt reaches a threshold default
VD, called barrier default, at time TD = inf {t ≥ 0, Vt ≤ VD} 1. In case of a default,
we allow for two policies: (1) The government negotiates with its lender to reduce
the debt service by a fraction φ ∈ [0, 1]. (2) The government increases firm’s
income tax rate from τ to τ + ∆ (∆ > 0). In the absence of government default,
∆ = 0. According to Shiller 2013, "increasing taxes during an economic crisis
makes perfect sense". In additional, in the European crisis 2011, Greece, Spain,
Portugal increased the income tax to decrease the deficit (OCDE-Publishing 2013).
If the government choose to default, it must pay a default cost 2:
λEt
[
τVTDe
−r(TD−t)] (3.2)
where λ is a fraction of reduction in the firm asset, r is the risk-free interest
rate. Jeanneret 2013 argues that because the firm pays its income tax to the
government, sovereign asset is a fraction of the firm asset. At the default time
TD, in order to pay the default cost, the government must reduce firm asset by a
fraction λ. Equation (3.2) is the present value of the default cost.
Definition 1. The net sovereign asset (NSA) is equal to the present value of
1. We can write τVt < VD1, so Vt < VD where VD = VD1/τ
2. The asset value at the default point TD is VTD which is equal to default threshold VD
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the net government income at time t minus the default cost:
NSA = Et
[∫ TD
t
(τVu − C)e−r(u−t)du+
∫ ∞
TD
{(τ + ∆)Vu − (1− φ)C}e−r(u−t)du
]
− λEt
[
τVDe
−r(TD−t)] (3.3)
Equation (3.3) shows the intertemporal value of the net sovereign asset: The
first term depicts the NSA before default time TD; the second term is the NSA
after default when the set of policies have been applied. At the default time TD,
the government increases the income tax by τ + ∆ while negotiating a reduction
in its debt service by a fraction φ. The rest of coupon service is (1 − φ)C. The
third term is the default cost.
Proposition 1. By using Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2, we obtain the net
sovereign asset:
NSA =
τVt
r − µ −
C
r
+
(
Vt
VD
)β [(
∆
r − µ − λτ
)
VD +
φC
r
]
(3.4)
where β = − 2r
σ2
Proof. See Appendix A.
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The government policy is to maximize the net sovereign asset value. The
optimal default barrier derived from this policy is displayed in the Proposition 2
below:
Proposition 2. The default barrier, VD, is determined at the time when the
sovereign asset reaches to the default barrier:
V ∗D =
Cφβ(r − µ)
r(1− β)[∆− λτ(r − µ)] = Cϕ (3.5)
where ϕ =
φβ(r − µ)
r(1− β)[∆− λτ(r − µ)] ; β = −
2r
σ2
Proof. See Appendix A.
The central purpose of this paper is to determine the sovereign credit spread
from the two policies: increasing the corporate income tax and partially reducing
the debt. The sovereign credit spread is the difference between the yield on risk
debt and the risk-free rate, which is shown by equation (3.6) in the Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Sovereign Credit Spread (SCS) is measured by:
SCS = r
 1
1− φ
(
Vt
Cϕ
)β − 1
 (3.6)
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation method
In order to estimate the sovereign credit spread in equation (3.6), we must
find the unknown asset value that cannot be observed. To do that, we draw
upon the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) proposed by Duan 1994. The
transformed-data method will find unknown asset value from observed equity value
through the log-likelihood function.
We have the observed equity is a function of the unknown asset value E = f(V ),
which yields V = f−1(E). We express the log-likelihood function for the observed
equity as:
L(E, θ) = L(V, θ)−
n∑
t=2
ln
∂f(Vt)
∂Vt
= L(V, θ)−
n∑
t=2
ln
∂Et
∂Vt
(3.7)
where θ = (µ, σ), L(V, θ) is the log-likelihood function for unknown asset Vt.
Using ∂Et/∂Vt = N (dt), we obtain:
L(E, θ) = L(V, θ)−
n∑
t=2
ln(N (dt)) (3.8)
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L(E, θ) = −n− 1
2
ln(2pi)−n− 1
2
ln(σ2)− 1
2σ2
n∑
t=2
[ln(
Vt
Vt−1
)−µ]2−
n∑
t=2
ln(N (dt))
(3.9)
Duan 1994 uses the algorithm of quadratic Hill-Climbing proposed by Goldfeld
et al. 1966 to find the maximum likelihood value. In our empirical results, we apply
the simplex algorithm 3 to maximum likelihood proposed by Lagarias et al. 1998.
Using maximum likelihood estimation helps to find estimated value θˆ = (µˆ, σˆ) and
Vˆt from input data of observed equity and default barrier.
3.3 Empirical results
3.3.1 Data Description
In this chapter, we use daily data from the period 2000-2011 for four emerging
countries: Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Turkey. MSCI is a stock market price which
represents the sovereign equity index. EMBI+ is the Emerging Market Bond Index
which represents the benchmark sovereign credit spread. Both MSCI and EMBI+
are taken from Datastream. The evolution of the MSCI and EMBI+ is shown in
Figure 3.1:
3. To find the maximum likelihood value L(E), we switch the problem by finding the minimum
value −L(E)
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of MSCI and EMBI+ of Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Turkey
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To set-up the remaining variables, we use the calibrate value from Jeanneret
2013 because we calculate in the same period and the same country. We set: the
average 10-year U.S. Treasury rate represent the risk-free interest rate r=0.04, the
corporate income tax for emerging country τ = 0.3, the default cost rate λ = 0.05,
reduce rate of debt φ = 0.6 and C = 1%, ∆ =1%.
3.3.2 Estimation from MLE
The difference of default threshold of each country depends on the estimated
value of µˆ, σˆ from the maximum likelihood estimation. The loop of simplex algo-
rithm in MLE requires a starting point for µ, σ. Like Jeanneret 2013, we use the
mean and volatility of MSCI growth as a starting point of µ, σ. The estimated
coefficients µˆ, σˆ are reported in Table 3.1 in below:
Variable Brazil Mexico Peru Turkey
σˆ 0.3014 0.2511 0.2575 0.4550
µˆ 0.1315 0.1152 0.1761 0.0933
Source : author’s calculation
Table 3.1: Estimated coefficients from MLE
The estimated default barrier in equation (3.5) is calculated from estimated
coefficient of µˆ, σˆ.
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3.3.3 Comparing between estimated Credit Spread and bench-
mark Credit Spread
The estimated sovereign credit spread is calculated from the estimated coeffi-
cient of µˆ, σˆ in Table 3.1 and the estimated asset value from maximum likelihood
estimation.
We compare the estimated sovereign credit spread with the Emerging Market
Bond Index represented by the benchmark sovereign credit spread in order to
verify the tendency and the fluctuation of the two curves. The comparison shows
in Figure 3.2 below:
As shown in Figure 3.2, the estimated sovereign credit spread and EMBI+
are fairly homogeneous and have an upward slope throughout the period. Two
crises occurred in the period 2000-2011: the 2002 internet bubble and the global
financial crisis in 2007. The estimated country risk increases for each of the crises,
following with EMBI+ benchmark. For the case of Brazil and Mexico, the two
curves almost coincide in this period. Especially, there is a small residual in 2002
for Brazil and after 2007 for Mexico. For the case of Peru and Turkey, the two
curves do not coincide, but they do follow the same path.
To test the robustness of the path-relevance of our model, we make use of an
econometric model assessing the statistical significance of the relationship between
the model and the benchmark. Is there a cointegration relationship in the long-
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Figure 3.2: Comparison between the estimated Sovereign Credit Spread and
EMBI+
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run? This question will be answered in the next section.
3.3.4 Model Validation
In this section, we investigate two econometric methods to validate the model
of sovereign credit spread. We test the evolution between estimated sovereign
spread and the benchmark spread. If the two series have the same evolution, we
will apply the second econometric method to verify the long-run existence of the
evolution by using a cointegration test.
Evolution between estimated sovereign spread and benchmark spread
The graphics in Figure 3.2 show the same evolution of two curves of estimated
sovereign spread and the benchmark spread. Here, we test the relationship of
evolution of the two curves, i.e., we verify whether there is an increase (decrease)
of the estimated sovereign spread respectively when EMBI+ increases (decreases).
We use the following equation:
EMBI+t = α + γSCSt + εt (3.10)
where SCS is the estimated sovereign credit spread from the model, EMBI+
is Emerging Market Bond Index Plus, represented for country’s observed credit
spread. The expected sign of γ is positive. The results are mentioned in Table 3.2:
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Coefficient Brazil Mexico Peru Turkey
α -0.161*** 0.0515*** 0.2575*** -1.0259***
(0.0093) (0.0082) (0.0061) (0.0021)
γ 1.317*** 0.5429** 1.0921*** 1.7285**
(0.010) (0.0108) (0.010) (0.0175)
Adj R2 0.835 0.443 0.791 0.756
Observations 3130 3130 3130 3130
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; ***,**,* means that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%
level.
Table 3.2: Regression Coefficients
The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 3.2. The coefficients of γ are
positive and significant at 1% level as expected which are 1.317, 1.0921 for Brazil
and Peru, and are 0.5429, 1.7285, significant at 5% level as expected for Mexico
and Turkey respectively. These results reflect the evolution of estimated sovereign
credit risk of the model explained by the evolution of EMBI+ in the period 2000-
2011. The results also suggest the magnitude by which the sovereign credit spread
would fluctuate for a given change in EMBI+.
Cointegration test between estimated sovereign spread and benchmark
spread
In this section we test whether there is a cointegration relationship between
the estimated sovereign spread and the EMBI+ in the long-run. The existence of
such a cointegration relationship would be a strong sign of the relevance of the
model.
Before testing for cointegration test, we start by testing the stationarity of the
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two series SCS and EMBI+. For each test, the optimal lag is obtained by choosing
the critical AIC selection 4 and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistic. The null
hypothesis is that the series contains a unit root. We study two model: the first
model with intercept only, the second model with intercept and trend. The results
are mentioned in Table 3.3 below:
Model Brazil Mexico Peru Turkey
Stat-SCS Constant -0.7359 -1.0074 -0.7190 -1.7260
(0.8358) (0.7527) (0.8401) (0.4180)
Stat-SCS Constant and Trend -2.0966 -2.1620 -1.7341 -2.8074
(0.5469) (0.5101) (0.7360) (0.1946)
Stat-EMBI Constant -1.6568 -2.3034 -1.7275 -1.9245
(0.4532) (0.1710) (0.4172) (0.3212)
Stat-EMBI Constant and Trend -2.5490 -2.5111 -2.6501 -2.6681
(0.3043) (0.3227) (0.2579) (0.2501)
Stat-∆SCS Constant -11.5661*** -15.8172*** -12.1003*** -10.6001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Stat-∆SCS Constant and Trend -11.5723*** -15.8146*** -12.0975*** -10.6141***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Stat-∆EMBI Constant -10.2390*** -10.0320*** -51.9538*** -18.5117***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Stat-∆EMBI Constant and Trend -10.2393*** -10.0295*** -51.9455*** -18.5090***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes: ∆ is first difference, p-value in parentheses. *** means that we reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root at the 1%.
Table 3.3: Unit root test
Table 3.3 gives the ADF statistics for SCS and EMBI+ series in level and in
the first difference of each countries. The two series SCS and EMBI+ in level
are non-stationary based on the reported p-value. The first difference of both
variables rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1% level. Finally, both
are integrated in the same order I(1). Therefore, we can use the cointegration test
between SCS and EMBI+ in order to verify the long-run cointegration between
4. Maxlag=28
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SCS and EMBI+.
We compute the residual between the EMBI+ and the estimated sovereign
credit risk from equation (3.10), et = EMBIt − γˆSCSt − αˆ, in order to verify
the stationary of the residual series. To ensure that the cointegration relationship
being accepted, the residual must be stationary. We study two model: the first
model with intercept only, the second model without intercept. The unit root test
estimation of the residual between EMBI+ and SCS is shown in Table 3.4:
Model Brazil Mexico Peru Turkey
Constant t-statistic -2.713* -3.091** -3.708*** -2.656*
Prob (0.071) (0.027) (0.004) (0.082)
None t-statistic -2.713*** -3.092*** -3.709*** -2.656***
Prob (0.0065) (0.002) (0.000) (0.007)
Notes: p-value in parentheses. ***,**,* means that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Table 3.4: Unit root test of the residual between EMBI+ and SCS
Table 3.4 gives the ADF statistics for the residual series in level of each coun-
tries. Based on the reported p-value, the residues in level are stationary for both
models. Therefore, we can estimate the error correction model.
When the series are non-stationary and cointegrated, it should estimate their
relationship across a error correction model (ECM). We use the cointegration tests
for times series proposed by Granger 1981, Engle and Granger 1987. According
to Engle and Granger 1987, if two cointegrated series can be represented by an
ECM. We test the short-run dynamic effect from the error correction model from
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equation (3.11):
∆EMBI+t = β∆SCSt + δet−1 + νt (3.11)
where et−1 = EMBIt−1− γˆSCSt−1− αˆ, the coefficient δ < 0 must be negative and
significant in long-run equilibrium.
The estimation of the error correction model is presented in Table 3.5:
Coefficient Brazil Mexico Peru Turkey
β 1.566** 0.956** 0.829** 1.201**
(0.038) (0.037) (0.063) (0.035)
δ -0.0085*** -0.0046*** -0.0081*** -0.0141***
(0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.004)
Adj R2 0.354 0.176 0.055 0.266
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; ***,**,* means that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%
level.
Table 3.5: Regression coefficients of the error correction model
The results observed in Table 3.5: We have four coefficients of δ be negative
which are -0.0085, -0.0081, -0.0141, -0.0046 significant at 1% for Brazil, Peru,
Turkey and Mexico respectively. This result confirms that the error correction
model is validated.
Therefore, by examining two case of the test of cointegration and the error
correction model between the two series EMBI+ and the estimated sovereign credit
spread, the results are robust indicating the relationship between the two series be
similar and consistent in long-run.
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3.4 Conclusion and Perspectives
This chapter provided a stochastic model to determine the daily sovereign
credit spread when the government propose two policies: increasing corporate
income tax and reducing a part of debt. The sovereign credit spread is computed
by the difference between the yield on risky debt and risk-free rate. To deal with
the important step of estimating the sovereign credit spread from the unobservable
asset value, we opted for the simplex algorithm to find the maximum likelihood
estimation proposed by Lagarias et al. 1998. Then, we could estimate the asset
value from the sovereign equity and its debt represented by the MSCI and the
default barrier.
Our findings for Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Turkey indicate that two series of
the estimated sovereign credit spread and the Emerging Market Bond Index Plus
follow a common evolution. We performed a regression between the two in order to
verify the similarity in path and its statistical relevance of the two series. In other
words, if the EMBI+ increases/decreases, the estimated sovereign credit spread
increases/decreases respectively.
Furthermore, we use the cointegration test to investigate the existence of a
relationship in long-run between the sovereign credit spread and the EMBI+. We
conclude on the existence of such a relationship. Therefore, the estimated sovereign
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spread credit will be similar to the EMBI+ in the long-run. This mean that the
two policies we propose are reasonable and significant. Hence, this index also
become a proxy to determine the sovereign default risk.
Perspective
This result sketch promising avenues of research. Notably, investigating the
case of a country initial gross endowment as assumed in Andrade 2009 or the
case of using other collateral assets when borrowing from international markets
could prove useful for deepening the understanding of the sovereign default risk
dynamics.
CHAPTER 4
Long-Run Determinants of the Sovereign CDS spread in
emerging countries
4.1 Introduction
Credit Default Swap (CDS) is an insurance contract between a seller and a
buyer that allows investors to buy protection against default. It was invented
from JP Morgan in 1994. The buyer pays a fee to the seller (called CDS premium
or spread), in exchange, the buyer of the CDS receives compensation from the
seller if a default occurs. The aim of sovereign CDS is to insure the sovereign
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bonds buyer against the default of government bond. The larger the CDS spread
on a government bond, the higher the risk of default on that bond by the issuing
government.
The CDS spread quotes in basis points, and the majority of the quotation is
denominated in USD. The quotation of CDS provides the information of CDS to
traders or investors as well as gives us information on the perception of market
risk. In fact, a decline in the equity market leads to an increase in credit spread
which implies an increase of the probability of default as well as an increase of
demand for CDS protection. Hence, the higher the risk of default, the larger the
CDS spread as demonstrated by Chan-Lau 2003, 2006. In addition, the default
probability can be computed and predicted from the CDS spread. Hence, since
then the CDS spread has been a proxy of country default risk. Moreover, the
economic crisis raises a number of important questions regarding the determinants
of the sovereign CDS spread. And more importantly, clarifying the long-run de-
terminants of sovereign CDS spread in long-run should help regulators designing
policies aiming at reducing a country default risk. Therefore, in this chapter, we
suggest a study of the long-run and short-run determinants of the sovereign CDS
spread.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In section 2, we show the
determinants of sovereign CDS spread. In section 3 we present the econometric
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methodology to investigate long-run determinants of sovereign CDS spread as well
as the empirical results. We conclude in the third section.
4.2 Determinants of sovereign CDS spread
In fact, numerous articles link the relationship between the fundamental factors
and sovereign credit default proxies such as sovereign credit ratings and sovereign
default probability.
Actually, J. I. Bulow and Rogoff 1988 show that exchange rate variations have
a direct impact on a country’s terms of trade, which may affect the ability of the
country to generate dollar revenue and so make payments on its external debt.
Hernandez-Trillo 1995 indicates that the default probability of sovereign de-
pends on: the degree of openness, international reserves and the risk-free interest
rate. According to his model, he creates a spread index over LIBOR and debt
service ratio to determine the sovereign default probability, and defines the de-
fault probability as a function of the cost of default. He concludes for 33 debtors
emerging countries in the period 1970-1988 where liberalization policies decreases
the probability of default by both raising the GDP and increasing openness. A
country default will induce a loss in access to future credit. This model displays a
negative effect of openness and international reserves on the default probability.
Then, Cantor and Packer 1996 regress a country’s ability and willingness-to-
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service its debt for a panel of developing countries. They find six variables affecting
the sovereign credit rating which are per capita income, GDP growth, inflation
rate, external debt, default history and an economic development indicator.
Additionally, Mellios and Paget-Blanc 2006 determine two other factors: gov-
ernment income and change in the real exchange rate. These variables have a
positive impact on default probability except for the inflation rate. Baek et al.
2005 show the link between sovereign risk in emerging countries and macroeco-
nomic variables such as government budget balance and current account balance.
Georgievska et al. 2008 use the Bayesian approach to find three classified vari-
ables explaining sovereign default: total debt to GDP ratio and Export to GDP
ratio represent solvency variables, international reserves to GDP ratio express liq-
uidity and currency account balance to GDP ratio and imports to GDP ratio
variables represent macroeconomic variables. More recently, Ramos-Francia and
Rangel 2012 create a sovereign spread index as the difference between the long-
term government bonds yield and the 10-year US Treasuries yield. They test the
relationship of this index with macroeconomic variables such as inflation, economic
growth, fiscal and current account deficits, international reserves and nominal ex-
change rate variations. These results illustrate that international reserves and
exchange rate appreciations are associated with lower default risk in emerging
markets.
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Nevertheless, there are a few studies mentioning the determinants of sovereign
CDS in emerging markets. For example, IMF-Report 2013 introduces the determi-
nants of the CDS spread by regressing it on various macroeconomics and financial
explanatory variables. This paper finds that the debt/GDP ratio and GDP growth
rate increase the spread whereas international reserves reduce it. Aizenman et al.
2013 show that the external debt/GDP ratio and inflation explain the sovereign
CDS spread in the crisis period while in the post-crisis period, this index is caused
by inflation and public debt/GDP ratio. However, these regressions take into ac-
count the influence of these explanatory variables to the sovereign default proxies
over a specific period but do not examine their effect in the long-run.
The sovereign CDS 5-year spread is the most traded in the CDS market be-
cause of its liquidity. In 2007, this index appeared in the emerging markets. Since
then, it has been considered as a proxy of sovereign default risk. Figure 4.1 shows
the development of sovereign CDS 5-year spread of eight typical emerging coun-
tries between 2008.Q4 and 2013.Q2. The graph clearly indicates that the country
default risk for all countries of this panel is homogeneous in this period. Moreover,
the economic crisis raises a number of important questions regarding the determi-
nants of the sovereign CDS spread. And more importantly, clarifying the long-run
determinants of sovereign CDS spread in long-run should help regulators designing
policies aiming at reducing a country default risk.
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In this chapter, our contribution is an empirical result of the long-run relation-
ship between the sovereign CDS spread and fundamental macroeconomics for this
panel group. The explanatory variables we propose are the government’s solvency,
the government’s liquidity and macroeconomics situation represented by the exter-
nal debt to GDP ratio, the international reserves to GDP ratio and the current ac-
count to GDP ratio respectively. These variables are very important to determine
the sovereign default risk. In fact, the sovereign CDS spread captures the external
debt in emerging countries. Hence, when the external debt burden increases, it
would be expected to increase spreads. The second variable we mention above is
international reserves. This variable has negative effects on sovereign CDS spread,
i.e., the higher government’s liquidity, the smaller the sovereign default probability
as well as sovereign CDS spread. The current account is an important macroeco-
nomic variable represented by economy’s health which is influenced by numerous
factors such as policies of trade balance, investment and others. According to Baek
et al. 2005; Ramos-Francia and Rangel 2012, the current account and international
reserves would reduce the sovereign CDS spread.
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Figure 4.1: Sovereign CDS spread 5-year
4.3 Econometric approach and Empirical results
Data Description
In this paper, we use quarterly data from 2008.Q4 to 2013.Q2 1 for eight emerg-
ing countries: Brazil, Malaysia, South-Korea, Thailand, Turkey, South Africa, In-
donesia and Mexico. Sovereign CDS 5-year in log denoted LCDS is taken from
Reuters. CA is a ratio of the current account to GDP, ED is a ratio of the external
debt to GDP. Both are found in Central Bank of each country. RES, the ratio of
international reserves to GDP, is from the IMF International Financial Statistic.
The evolution of the current account, the external debt, international reserves and
1. Our time period is constrained by data availability.
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the sovereign CDS spread is shown in Figure 4.2, and the descriptive statistics are
resumed in Table 4.1:
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of the current account, the external debt, international
reserves and the sovereign CDS spread
In order to test the long-run relationship between the sovereign CDS spread
and the explanatory variables for the emerging panel, we apply the panel unit
root and the panel cointegration tests. The panel unit root aims at verifying that
all variables are integrated with the same order. The panel cointegration test is
to study the existence of cointegration between all variables. These tests are the
necessary condition to test the panel long-run estimation.
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Bra Mala S-Kor Thai Tur S-Afri Indo Mexi
LCDS Min 4.677 4.304 4.189 4.409 4.853 4.782 4.855 4.562
Max 5.791 5.490 5.820 5.541 6.022 5.948 6.461 5.982
Mean 4.985 4.669 4.787 4.851 5.333 5.154 5.290 4.947
Range 1.114 1.186 1.631 1.132 1.170 1.166 1.606 1.419
StDev 0.328 0.372 0.459 0.338 0.332 0.330 0.458 0.375
Variance 0.107 0.138 0.210 0.114 0.110 0.109 0.210 0.141
Skewness 1.466 1.130 1.147 0.865 0.650 1.378 1.689 1.582
Kurtosis 1.570 0.284 0.663 -0.254 -0.258 1.586 2.297 2.331
CA Min -0.042 0.011 0.000 -0.045 -0.111 -0.235 -0.005 -0.031
Max -0.006 0.167 0.058 0.156 -0.007 0.006 0.014 0.003
Mean -0.022 0.104 0.035 0.024 -0.061 -0.055 0.002 -0.010
Range 0.036 0.156 0.058 0.202 0.104 0.241 0.020 0.034
StDev 0.008 0.048 0.017 0.048 0.030 0.062 0.005 0.009
Variance 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000
Skewness -0.668 -0.475 -0.559 1.085 0.071 -2.436 1.042 -0.802
Kurtosis 1.007 -0.794 -0.512 1.979 -0.759 5.402 0.820 0.363
RES Min 0.473 1.533 1.022 1.636 0.395 0.386 0.062 0.379
Max 0.704 1.958 1.164 2.129 0.498 0.531 0.158 0.541
Mean 0.559 1.742 1.097 1.892 0.444 0.448 0.114 0.453
Range 0.231 0.425 0.141 0.494 0.102 0.145 0.096 0.162
StDev 0.068 0.111 0.041 0.129 0.035 0.036 0.028 0.057
Variance 0.005 0.012 0.002 0.017 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
Skewness 0.712 -0.209 -0.230 -0.285 0.180 0.580 -0.151 0.381
Kurtosis -0.559 -0.327 -0.449 -0.107 -1.265 0.933 -1.192 -1.518
ED Min 0.405 1.038 1.338 0.044 1.429 0.993 0.241 0.656
Max 0.584 1.491 1.685 0.211 1.912 1.526 0.429 0.841
Mean 0.495 1.178 1.453 0.111 1.631 1.208 0.330 0.744
Range 0.180 0.453 0.347 0.167 0.482 0.533 0.188 0.185
StDev 0.058 0.113 0.095 0.056 0.127 0.161 0.047 0.047
Variance 0.003 0.013 0.009 0.003 0.016 0.026 0.002 0.002
Skewness 0.195 1.549 0.883 0.539 0.810 0.685 0.298 0.576
Kurtosis -1.549 2.229 0.585 -1.013 0.492 -0.450 -0.189 0.208
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
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4.3.1 Panel unit root
Theoretical introduction
Before testing cointegration test, we verify that all variables are integrated with
the same order. We employ the first generation panel unit root tests of Levin et al.
2002, Im et al. 2003 which are denoted LLC and IPS, and the second generation
one of Pesaran 2007 which is denoted CIPS. The null hypothesis is that the series
contain a unit root, while the alternative hypothesis is that the series do not
contain a unit root. All tests of the first generation are based on the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression.
We consider a autoregressive process AR(1) for panel data:
yit = ρiyit−1 +Xitδi + it (4.1)
where i = 1, 2, .., N cross-section series, t = 1, 2, ..., T period. Xit are the
explanatory variables, ρi are the autoregressive coefficient.
The first generation tests assume independently distributed residuals.
The basic equation of LLC test (Levin et al. 2002) for the panel unit root:
∆yit = αyit−1 +
pi∑
j=1
βij∆yi,t−j +X ′itδ + εi,t (4.2)
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where α = ρ− 1. The null and alternative hypothesis are:

H0 : α = 0
H1 : α < 0
Levin et al. 2002 assumes that all panels have the same autoregressive parameter,
and consider the terms ρi as homogeneous between individuals. They assume that
all inter-individual heterogeneity is captured by the fixed effects.
The LLC statistic (t-statistic) is based on ADF statistics and can be computed:
tˆ = T − (Σpi/N)− 1 (4.3)
But Im et al. 2003 allow each panel to have its own autoregressive parameter.
Im et al. 2003 challenge the homogeneity of autoregressive root hypothesis which
seems irrelevant.
The basic equation of IPS (Im et al. 2003) for the panel unit root is:
∆yit = αyit−1 +
pi∑
j=1
βij∆yit−j +X ′itδ + εi,t (4.4)
where: i = 1,2,...N cross-section series; t = 1,2,...T; αi is the individual fixed
effect; εi,t is the error term.
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The null hypothesis is H0 : α = 0,∀i, while the alternative hypothesis H1 are:

α = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., N1
α < 0, i = N1 + 1, N1 + 2, ..., N
The IPS statistic (t-statistic) is based on average ADF statistics and can be
calculated following:
t¯ =
1
N
N∑
j=1
ti (4.5)
where ti is the ADF t-statistic for country i.
The second generation test will then apply an interdependence between the
individual. We present the second generation of the panel unit root by the method
of Pesaran 2007. The panel unit root of Pesaran 2007 takes into account cross-
sectional dependence.
The CIPS statistic (Pesaran 2007) is based on average of individual Cross-
Sectional ADF (CADF) statistics and can be written as follow:
∆yit = αi + ρiyit−1 + ciyt−1 + di∆y¯t−1 + νit
p∑
j=1
φijyi,t−j + εi,t; (4.6)
4.3. Econometric approach and Empirical results 111
CPIS =
1
N
N∑
j=1
ti(N, T ) (4.7)
where ti is the statistics from each CADF administered to each individual i of
the panel.
Panel unit root result
The panel unit root tests are presented for all variables in levels and in first
differences in Table 4.2.
Series Levin, Lin, Chu Im, Pesaran, Shin Pesaran (CIPS)
LCDS -9.2466***(0.0000) -3.4171***(0.0003) -1.671 (0.564)
CA -0.9600(0.1685) -1.3269*(0.0923) -2.008(0.222)
RES -0.2669(0.3948) -0.7367(0.2306) -1.888(0.332)
ED -1.3043*(0.0961) 0.0450(0.5179) -1.918(0.303)
∆LCDS -5.1157***(0.0000) -4.7774***(0.0000) -2.559** (0.011)
∆CA -6.8535***(0.0000) -6.5774***(0.0000) -2.944*** (0.003)
∆RES -4.3401***(0.0000) -6.4481***(0.0000) -2.817***(0.001)
∆ED -0.5025(0.3076) -6.6663***(0.0000) -3.339*** (0.000)
Notes: ***, * mean that we reject the null hypothesis of unit root at the 1%, 10% level.
P-value in parentheses
Table 4.2: Panel unit root for sovereign CDS, current account, external debt and
exchange rate
For the first generation of panel unit root: The variables LCDS is stationary
according to LLC and IPS at a 1% level. The variable CA is stationary according
to the IPS test at a 10% level but not according to the LLC test. The variable RES
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is not stationary according to both LLC, IPS tests. The variable ED is stationary
with LLC test at the 10% level, but not IPS test. Variables in first-differences are
all stationary no matter the test.
The second generation CIPS test solves the biased results in the first generation.
Focusing on the CIPS test, all variables in level are integrated with the same order
I(1). Therefore, we can test the existence of cointegration relationship among
LCDS, CA, RES, ED.
4.3.2 Panel cointegration Test
We apply the panel cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni 1999 and Kao
1999. Both tests are based on the cointegration test of Engle and Granger 1987.
The null hypothesis of the both tests is no cointegration.
We consider the following long-run regression:
LCDSit = α0t + δit+
M∑
j=1
αjtXji,t + εit (4.8)
where: i = 1, 2, ...N ; t = 1, 2, ...T ; X are the explanatory variables (CA,RES,ED).
LCDS and X are assumed to be integrated order I(1).
The estimated residual is constructed as follows:
εˆit = ρˆiεˆit−1 + uˆit (4.9)
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where ρi is the autoregressive term of the residual.
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is H0 : ρi = 1, while the two alternative
hypothesis H1 are:

(ρi = ρ) = 1, ∀i
ρi < 1,∀i
Pedroni 1999 presents seven statistics depended on the two alternative hy-
pothesis:
— The homogeneous alternative (ρi = ρ) = 1, Pedroni shows the four statistics
are based on within-dimension: Panel-v, Panel-ρ, Panel-PP, Panel-ADF.
— The heterogeneous alternative ρi < 1, Pedroni shows the three statistics are
based on between-dimension: Group ρ-statistic, Group PP-statistic, Group
ADF-statistic.
These tests allow for heterogeneous intercepts and trends coefficients across
cross-sections. The calculation of the seven statistics is found in the original article
of Pedroni 1999.
Kao 1999 based the same approach as the Pedroni test, but specified cross-
section specific intercept and homogeneous coefficients on the first-stage regres-
sors 2. Kao’s test is performed over the residual estimation based on Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test.
2. See Kao 1999 and Eviews 6 User’s Guide for detail
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The results are shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 in below:
Pedroni(1999) Statistic Prob.
Panel-v 0.7316 0.4977
Panel-ρ -1.3928 0.1267
Panel-PP -2.300*** 0.0030
Panel-ADF -1.5619*** 0.0026
Group ρ-statistic 0.1727 0.5686
Group PP-statistic -2.9813*** 0.0014
Group ADF-statistic -3.1012*** 0.0010
Notes: *** means that we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% level. We
choose the AIC critical with a max lag of 3; No intercept or trend and Newey-West and
Bartlett kernel selection.
Table 4.3: Panel cointegration test: Pedroni test
Kao(1999) Statistic Prob.
ADF 1.4535* 0.0730
Notes: * means that we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 10% level.
We choose the AIC critical with a max lag of 4; No trend and Newey-West and Quadratic
Spectral kernel selection.
Table 4.4: Panel cointegration test: Kao test
Table 4.3: Regarding the Panel-PP, Panel-ADF (within-dimension) statistic
and Group PP-statistic and Group ADF-statistic (between-dimension), the results
present that we have 4/7 tests that reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration
at the 1 % level, except Panel-v, Panel-ρ and Group-ρ are not significant. More
that, the results in Table 4.4 confirm that we reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration with ADF statistic at the 10 % level. Therefore, we can conclude
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that there is cointegration between sovereign CDS spread and current account,
external debt and international reserves.
4.3.3 Panel cointegration Estimation : Pooled Mean Group
estimation
In order to test Panel cointegration estimation, we use Pooled Mean Group
(PMG), Mean Group estimation (MG) and Fixed Effect Estimation approach.
Pooled Mean Group estimates the presence of dynamic long-run based on the
methodology of M Hashem Pesaran et al. 1997, 1999.
We analyse the role of the current account, the external debt and international
reserves with sovereign CDS spread for all countries in this panel. The use of the
PMG estimator is consistent with some recent literature such as Martinez-Zarzoso
and Bengochea-Morancho 2004; Bangake and Eggoh 2012.
The approach we adopted here is the determination of long-term relationship
among LCDS, CA, RES, ED, LER. Here, we investigate cointegration estimation
using an empirical formalization using panel data.
We assume that the long-run sovereign CDS function:
LCDSit = α0t + α1tCAit + α2tRESit + α3tEDit + µi + εit (4.10)
Where LCDS is sovereign CDS in log; CA is ratio of the current account to GDP;
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RES is ratio of international reserves to GDP; ED is ratio of the external debt to
GDP; i = 1, 2, ..., 8 is the number of countries; t = 1, 2...T is number of periods.
We assume that all these variables are I(1) and co-integrated for individual
countries, leading the error term an I(0) process for all i.
The ARDL(1,1,1,1) dynamic panel specification of equation (4.10) is:
LCDSit = δ10iCAit+δ11iCAi,t−1+δ20iRESit+δ21iRESi,t−1+δ30iEDit+δ31iEDi,t−1
+ λiLCDSi,t−1µi + it (4.11)
The error correction (ec) of equation (4.11) is:
∆LCDSit = φi(LCDSi,t−1 − α0i − α1iCAit − α2iRESit − α3iEDit)
+ δ11i∆CAit + δ21i∆RESit + δ31i∆EDit + it (4.12)
Where
φi = −(1 − λi), α0i = µi
1− λi , α1i =
δ10i + δ11i
1− λi , α2i =
δ20i + δ21i
1− λi , α3i =
δ30i + δ31i
1− λi ,
The error-correction of adjustment parameter is φi, the long-run coefficient is
α1i, α2i, α3i for CA, RES, ED respectively. In long-run equilibrium, the coefficient
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of error-correction φi must be negative and significant. PMG allows for hetero-
geneous common long-run for all countries, and short-run dynamic the sovereign
CDS, the current account to GDP, the external debt to GDP and international
reserves to GDP. However, MG will produce consistent estimates of the average of
the parameters (M Hashem Pesaran et al. 1997, 1999).
Variable Long-run coef. (PMG) Long-run coef. (MG) Long-run coef. (DFE)
CA -3.535*** -13.981** -5.132**
(1.139) (5.796) (2.211)
ED 2.470*** -1.959 0.088
(0.319) (4.263) (0.532)
RES -5.610*** -4.379** -0.807
(0.873) (1.904) (0.655)
constant 2.611*** 4.259*** 2.128
(0.560) (1.193) (0.211)
ec -0.437*** -0.606*** -0.385***
(0.112) (0.100) (0.181)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** means that the coefficient is significant at
the 1%, 5% level
Table 4.5: Panel cointegration estimation: Pooled Mean Group, Mean Group and
Dynamic Fixed Effect
Table 4.5 shows the Pooled Mean Group, Mean Group estimation and Dynamic
Fixed Effect estimation. In these estimations, the coefficient sign of the current
account is always negative and significant at the 5 % level. But, the coefficient
sign of international reserves is negative and significant at the 1 % for Pooled
Mean Group and 5 % for Mean Group, not for Dynamic Fixed Effect estimation.
Addition, the coefficient sign of the external debt is negative for Mean Group and
positive as expected with theoretical economic for the Pooled Mean Group and the
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Dynamic Fixed Effect, but only significant statistically at the 1% level for Pooled
Mean Group estimation, not for the Dynamic Fixed Effect.
By taking into account both statistical and theoretical significance, the Pooled
Mean Group estimation is the best among the three. The PMG’s result in long-run
and short-run is shown in Table 4.6:
Variable Long-run coef. Variable Short-run coef.
CA -3.535*** ∆CA 3.148**
(1.139) (1.237)
ED 2.470*** ∆ED 1.779**
(0.319) (0.817)
RES -5.610*** ∆RES -1.803*
(0.873) (1.923)
constant 2.611***
(0.560)
ec -0.437***
(0.112)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * means that the coefficient is significant at
the 1%, 5%, 10%, level
Table 4.6: Panel cointegration estimation: Pooled Mean Group
The results of the long-run and short-run of the current account to GDP, the
external to GDP, international reserves to GDP and the error correction coefficient
report in Table 4.6. The estimated coefficient of error-correction in PMG is nega-
tive (-0.437) and significant at the 1% level as expected, confirming the existence
of long-run equilibrium.
The estimation results show that the coefficient of the current account to GDP
ratio is negative (-3.535) and significant at the 1 % level for all countries. This
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result reflects that a one unit increase in current account for all countries implies a
34 basic points decrease in the sovereign CDS spread. In a more detailed fashion,
if a country improves its current account deficit, it will have more money to service
its debt and its sovereign default probability, as well as its sovereign CDS spread,
will fall.
The coefficient of the external debt to GDP ratio is positive (2.470) and sig-
nificant for all countries at the 1 % level as expected. This finding clearly shows
that if the external debt increases by 1 %, the sovereign CDS spread will rise by
11 basic points. Indeed, the increase of the external debt burden leads to the rise
of the sovereign default probability. This affects the growth of the sovereign CDS
spread.
The coefficient of international reserves is negative (-5.610) and significant at
the 1 % level as expected. This result implies that if government’s liquidity in-
creases by 1 %, then the sovereign CDS spread will decline by 273 basic points.
By comparing the three coefficients, an interesting result that emerges is that the
impact of international reserves is the largest one. This issue suggests that in or-
der to reduce country’s risk in the long run, governments belonging to this panel
should focus more on increasing their international reserves rather than decreasing
their external debt and their current account deficit. Furthermore, to serve their
debt governments could use international reserves instead of trying to reduce the
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external debt burden and the current account deficit.
The estimation of the short-run coefficients are mentioned in Table 4.6 for the
global panel and in Table 4.7 for each country.
Variable Bra Mala S-Kor Thai Tur S-Afri Indo Mexi
∆CA -0.409 -0.902 5.122** 0.479 8.352*** 0.989 5.714 5.838
(6.739) (1.716) (2.383) (1.013) (1.257) (1.349) (15.89) (5.564)
∆RES -2.053 -0.791 2.529 -0.486 -3.918*** 3.867* -13.83 0.263
(3.219) (0.599) (2.679) (0.760) (1.269) (2.161) (15.94) (2.819)
∆ED 3.933 2.218*** -0.739 3.982 0.708 -1.634** 4.634 1.132
(3.076) (0.651) (1.507) (5.448) (0.439) (0.726) (5.338) (1.818)
Constant 2.132** 1.760* 6.033*** 1.770 3.601*** 1.036*** 1.767** 2.787**
(0.939) (0.925) (1.625) (1.298) (0.712) (0.386) (0.789) (1.123)
ec -0.315** -0.150* -0.813*** -0.120 -1.000*** -0.231*** -0.362** -0.505**
(0.140) (0.0792) (0.205) (0.0847) (0.169) (0.0808) (0.149) (0.201)
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Standard errors in parentheses
***, **, * means that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, level
Table 4.7: Panel cointegration estimation: short-run for each country in PMG
For the all countries, three short-run coefficients are significant statistically.
But in as expected, the external debt to GDP and international reserves to GDP
are significant as theoretical economics at the 5% and 1% level respectively. As
Figure 4.7 show, the short-run coefficient of international reserves is -3.918 signif-
icant as expected at the 1% level for Turkey. Likewise, the short-run coefficient
of external debt is 2.218 significant at the 1% level for Malaysia as expected. The
coefficient of the current account to GDP is not significant vis-à-vis theoretical
economics for the global panel and each country also.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter focused on linking between the sovereign CDS spread and the
current account, the external debt and international reserves in long-run and short-
run for eight emerging countries by using the model of the Pooled Mean Group,
Mean Group and Dynamic Fixed Effect.
Results from the panel unit root test show that the second generation CIPS
test of Pesaran 2007 solves the biased results in the first generation of Levin et al.
2002; Im et al. 2003. This result indicates that all variables in level are integrated
with the same order I(1). Hence, we can examine the panel cointegration test.
In the next step, we used the panel cointegration test proposed by Pedroni 1999;
Kao 1999. Our findings can consider that we reject the null hypothesis of non
cointegration, reporting the existence of a co-integration relationship among the
sovereign CDS spread, the current account, the external debt and international
reserves.
The main purpose of this chapter would be to focus in the long-run by using
the Pooled Mean Group, Mean Group of M Hashem Pesaran et al. 1997, 1999.
Our findings suggest a strong long-run effect of the current account, the external
debt and international reserves on the sovereign CDS spread in the whole panel.
In a more detailed fashion, we found the negative effect of the current account,
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international reserve and the positive effect of the external debt on the sovereign
CDS spread confirming all coefficients are significant and consistent with the eco-
nomic theory for all countries in the long-run. This contribution fills a gap in the
previous studies of Georgievska et al. 2008 and IMF-Report 2013 which take into
account only a specific and limited time period without examining the long run
effects. Finally, we find interestingly that international reserves have the largest
impact. In other words, regulators should focus on policies aiming at increasing
international reserves rather than solving the external debt burden and the current
account deficit.
Note also that our estimations also indicate that in the short-run, the external
debt and international reserves are significant for eight emerging countries. Es-
pecially, the short-run coefficients of international reserves, the external debt are
significant for Turkey, Malaysia respectively. The current account is not significant
in the short-run for all countries.
CHAPTER 5
Long-run determinants of sovereign bond in emerging
markets: New evidence from asymmetric and nonlinear
pass-through
5.1 Introduction
Since the financial crises in the 90s for Asia, in the 2000s for Latin America to
the current global financial crisis, the sovereign bond spread has been an important
indicator to measure the country risk. In this chapter, we investigate how to esti-
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mate the sovereign bond index, represented by Emerging Market Bond Index Plus
(EMBI+). This index will be determined in the short-run (SR) and long-run (LR)
from the fundamental macroeconomic variables by using an asymmetric model.
According to JP-Morgan 2004, the EMBI+ is a JPMorgan’s index capturing the
total return for liquid sovereign debt in emerging markets.
In this section, we start by reviewing the literature of determination of Emerg-
ing Market Bond Index Plus by fundamental macroeconomics variables. Many
papers have studied the relationship between the sovereign bond and the funda-
mental macroeconomics by the panel technique, but a limited number have used
time-series (Nogués and Grandes 2001; Ebner 2009). In a more detailed fashion,
Ferrucci 2003 tests 11 emerging countries from the period 1997-2002 in order to de-
termine the EMBI+ and EMBI Global in the short and long-term. His work finds
that external liquidity conditions are important factors of market spreads. More-
over, Petrova et al. 2010 have developed the work of Ferrucci 2003 by using fixed
effect for a long period from 1997.Q1-2009.Q2 for a panel of 14 emerging markets.
There are two groups of explanatory variables, the first consists of macroeconomic
variables such as the external debt/GDP 1, interest payments on external debt/re-
serves, short-term debt/reserves, external debt amortization/reserves, fiscal bal-
ance/GDP, current account balance/GDP, trade openness, the second of financial
1. They use an interpolation technique in order to convert the annual external debt to quar-
terly data
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variables such as a financial stress index, risk-free rate, U.S. 3-month Treasury bill
rate, 10-year government bond yield, and volatility index VIX (Min 1998).
Rowland and Torres 2004 use a random-effect generalized least squares regres-
sion for a panel of 16 emerging markets from 1998 to 2002. They find significant
explanatory variables including the economic growth rate, the debt-to-GDP ratio,
the reserves-to-GDP ratio, and the debt-to-exports ratio. Furthermore, Gupta
et al. 2008 explain the sovereign bond spreads by opting two-stage least squares
and Generalized Method of Moments for a panel of 30 emerging market economies
from 1997 to 2007. Their paper highlights the fiscal variable that is most essential
and has a larger impact on EMBI+. Jaramillo and Tejada 2011 study the fixed
effect for a panel of 35 emerging markets in the period 1997-2010 which indicates
that the investment grade status reduces bond spreads by 36 percent.
There are rare papers that analyse a specific country. Nogués and Grandes
2001 focus on how to determine Argentina’s EMBI+ in the period 1994 to 1998
by applying the estimation technique of M. Hashem Pesaran et al. 2001. They
find the existence of a long-run relationship between the following series: the debt-
service-to-export ratio, the GDP growth rate, the fiscal balance and the 30-year
US Treasury yield had a significant impact on the spread. In addition, for the ad-
vanced markets, Ebner 2009 creates the spread between 10 year Euro denominated
Central and Eastern European government bonds and their German counterpart.
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To explain the rising of these spreads, that article finds during crisis periods that
there are three explanatory factors: the market volatility, political instability and
global factors. The limitations of the previous papers is that they have not exam-
ined any asymmetric effect in the long-run and short-run. The contribution of my
chapter will fill this gap.
The literature reviewing of asymmetric and non-linear model begins with Balke
and Fomby 1997 who introduce the threshold cointegration with a regime-switching
type model. Granger and Yoon 2002 highlight the "hidden cointegration" explain-
ing that if the positive and negative components are cointegrated, the series bear
the "hidden cointegration". Schorderet 2003 develop the paper of Granger and
Yoon 2002 in order to estimate the asymmetric effect of hidden cointegration.
Based on the work of M. Hashem Pesaran et al. 2001, some studies test the coin-
tegration for small samples (Romilly et al. 2001; Narayan 2005; Baek and Gweisah
2013).
The asymmetric nonlinear approach is used in the recent articles: Katrakilidis
and Trachanas 2012 present the asymmetric consumer price index and GDP to
housing price for Greece’s case. Delatte and López-Villavicencio 2012; Elbejaoui
2013 study the asymmetric exchange rate pass-through to domestic general price
and to export/import prices respectively. Shin et al. 2014 show the empirical
result of the asymmetric unemployment on output. Atil et al. 2014 propose the
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pass through of crude oil prices to gasoline and natural gas prices.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in the next section we
present the econometric methodology to examine the long-run, short-run asym-
metry of the sovereign bond and then empirical results. The last section is a
conclusion.
5.2 Econometric approach
In this chapter, we study the cointegration autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)
to examine the fundamental macroeconomics to emerging market bond index.
The ARDL symmetry is developped by M. Hashem Pesaran et al. 2001, and the
nonliear ARDL (NARDL) asymmetry is extended for by Shin et al. 2014. This
methodology allows to estimate the asymmetry long-run and short-run relation-
ship. We contribute the empirical results of the long-run and the short-run asym-
metric relationship between the sovereign bond index and fundamental macroe-
conomics for two emerging market. Likewise the fourth chapter, we propose the
explanatory variables in this chapter are the current account to GDP ratio repre-
sented macroeconomic variable, the external debt to GDP ratio and international
reserves to GDP ratio represented the government’s solvency and the government’s
liquidity variable respectively.
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We assume that the cointegration long-run regression:
LEt = α0 + α1CAt + α2EDt + α3RESt + t (5.1)
where LE is Emerging Market Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) in log; CA is ratio of
current account to GDP; ED is ratio of external debt to GDP; RES is international
reserves to GDP ratio; t=1,2...T is number of periods.
Following Shin et al. 2014, we adopt the error correction model (ECM) to
estimate linear relationship:
∆LEt = c+ ρeLEt−1 + ρcCAt−1 + ρdEDt−1 + ρrRESt−1 +
p∑
i=1
bi∆LEt−i
+
q∑
i=0
ci∆CAt−i +
q∑
i=0
di∆EDt−i +
q∑
i=0
ei∆RESt−i + υt (5.2)
where ∆ is the first difference operator. ρe, ρc/ − ρe, ρd/ − ρe, ρr/ − ρe are
the error term, long-run coefficients of the current account, the external debt and
international reserves respectively; ci, di, ei are the short-run coefficients.
In order to determine asymmetry pass-through of current account 2 to sovereign
bond index, we employ the approach of Schorderet 2003; Shin et al. 2014. This
model requires the decomposition variables that are expressed by excess current
2. We do not present asymmetric effect of the external debt and international reserves in this
chapter because we do not find the cointegration between the EMBI+ and explanatory variables
if we allow the asymmetric effect of the external debt and international reserves in the model
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account and deficit current account. Two variables CA+ and CA− are partial sums
of positive and negative changes of the current account. These are calculated by:
CA+t =
t∑
j=1
∆CA+j =
t∑
j=1
max(∆CAj, 0);CA
−
t =
t∑
j=1
∆CA−j =
t∑
j=1
min(∆CAj, 0).
(5.3)
Equation (5.3), equation (5.2) can be expressed by long-run and short-run
asymmetry relationship by:
∆LEt = c+ρeLEt−1+ρ+c CA
+
t−1+ρ
−
c CA
−
t−1+ρdEDt−1+ρrRESt−1+
p∑
i=1
ϕi∆LEt−i
+
q∑
i=0
{pi+i ∆CA+t−i + pi−i ∆CA−t−i + di∆EDt−i + ei∆RESt−i}+ υt (5.4)
where L+ca = ρ+c / − ρe and L−ca = ρ−c / − ρe are positive and negative long-run
coefficients of the current account to EMBI+ respectively, and Ld = ρd/ − ρe,
Lr = ρr/ − ρe the long-run coefficient of the external debt, international reserves
to EMBI+.
Following Shin et al. 2014, Equation (5.4) can be modified to allow for long-
run symmetry & short-run asymmetry (Equation (5.5)) and long-run asymmetry
& short-run symmetry (Equation (5.6)).
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Only short-run asymmetry:
∆LEt = c+ ρeLEt−1 + ρcCAt−1 + ρdEDt−1 + ρrRESt−1 +
p∑
i=1
ϕi∆LEt−i
+
q∑
i=0
{pi+i ∆CA+t−i + pi−i ∆CA−t−i + di∆EDt−i + ei∆RESt−i}+ υt (5.5)
Only long-run asymmetry:
∆LEt = c+ρeLEt−1+ρ+c CA
+
t−1+ρ
−
c CA
−
t−1+ρdEDt−1+ρrRESt−1+
p∑
i=1
ϕi∆LEt−i
+
q∑
i=0
{pi+i ∆CAt−i + di∆EDt−i + ei∆RESt−i} + υt (5.6)
Equation (5.4), (5.5), (5.6) present the long-run cointegration between EMBI+
and positive/negative component of the current account with the two control vari-
able, such as the external debt and international reserves.
In order to test the existence of an asymmetric long-run cointegration, Shin
et al. 2014 propose the bounds test that is a joint test on all the lagged levels
regressors. There are two tests: t-statistic of Banerjee et al. 1998 and F -statistic
of M. Hashem Pesaran et al. 2001. The t-statistic tests the null hypothesis of
ρe = 0 against the alternative hypothesis ρe < 0. The F -statistic tests the null
hypothesis of ρe = ρ+c = ρ−c = ρd = ρr = 0 for the case of long-run asymmetry;
and ρe = ρc = ρd = ρr = 0 for the case of only long-run symmetry. If we reject the
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null hypothesis of no cointegration, indicating there is not a long-run relationship
among the variables.
The long-run symmetry can be tested by the Wald test of the null hypothesis
of L+ca = L−ca; to test the existence of short-run symmetry, we use the Wald test to
test the null hypothesis of
∑q
i=0 pi
+
i =
∑q
i=0 pi
−
i . If we reject the null hypothesis of
symmetric, implying the model allow the asymmetric effect.
When the null hypothesis of symmetric is rejected, we can find the asymmetric
dynamic multiplier of the change of the current account CA+ and CA− respec-
tively:
m+h =
h∑
j=0
∂LEt+j
∂CA+t
;m−h =
h∑
j=0
∂LEt+j
∂CA−t
(5.7)
where h → ∞, m+h → L+ca and m−h → L−ca. The dynamic multipliers could
capture the positive and negative shock of the current account on the EMBI+
from an initial equilibrium to the new equilibrium (Shin et al. 2014).
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5.3 Econometrics Results
5.3.1 Data
In this chapter, we use quarterly data from 2000.Q1 to 2011.Q4 for two typical
emerging countries: Brazil, Turkey. Emerging Market Bond Index in log denoted
LE is taken from Datastream. CA is the current account to GDP ratio, ED is
the external debt to GDP ratio. Both are found in Central Bank of each country.
RES is international reserves to GDP ratio (IMF International Financial Statistic).
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics.
Var. Min Max Mean StDev Skewness Kurtosis
Turkey LE 5.16 6.81 5.88 0.50 0.52 -1.07
CA -0.11 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.34 0.14
ED 1.31 2.59 1.66 0.30 1.40 1.58
RES 0.25 0.49 0.40 0.05 -0.56 0.17
Brazil LE 5.05 7.36 5.96 0.62 0.43 -0.82
CA -0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.10 -0.68
ED 0.40 1.99 0.95 0.50 0.51 -1.24
RES 0.17 0.57 0.37 0.12 0.21 -1.28
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
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5.3.2 Results
We first present the long-run relationship results by the bound test for the four
models: LR & SR symmetry with equation (5.2), LR, SR asymmetry with equation
(5.4), LR symmetry & SR asymmetry with equation (5.5) and LR asymmetry &
SR symmetry with equation (5.6). Both t-statistic and F -statistic are reported in
Table 5.2 below:
LR & SR
symmetry
LR symmetry &
SR asymmetry
LR asymmetry
& SR symmetry
LR & SR
asymmetry
Turkey tBMD -3.813** -0.782 −3.586i -0.543
FPSS 5.767** 4.258** 4.784** 5.278**
WLR - - 9.659 0.264
WSR - 6.066 - 16.236
Brazil tBMD -3.217* -3.649** −3.112i -3.941**
FPSS 3.496
i 4.605i 2.491i 4.777**
WLR - - 0.021 4.829
WSR - 1.324 - 1.727
Notes: tBMD denotes the t-statistic of Banerjee et al. 1998 and FPSS is the F-statistic of M. Hashem Pesaran
et al. 2001 testing the null hypothesis ρe = 0 and ρe = ρc = ρd = ρr = 0 (for only short-run asymmetric),
ρe = ρ
+
c = ρc = ρd = ρr = 0 (for long-run asymmetric) respectively. *,** indicate the rejection of the null
hypothesis of no cointegraion at the 10 %, 5 % level, and i implies that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of no cointegration. For Brazil, equation (5.4),(5.5),(5.6) is without the RES variable cause the sign of RES
is positive. Hence in order to avoid many table, we do not present the Brazil’s results with the RES variable,
therefore to test long-run relationship, we test ρe = 0, ρe = ρc = ρd = 0 (for only short-run asymmetric),
ρe = ρ
+
c = ρc = ρd = 0 (for long-run asymmetric)
Table 5.2: Bounds cointegration test
As shown in Table 5.2 for Turkey, all of F -test statistics exceed their upper
critical values so we can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration relationship
between the EMBI+ and explanatory variables. Nevertheless, t-test statistics are
infer the lower critical values for long-run symmetry & short-run asymmetry and
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long-run & short-run asymmetry model, implying we do not reject the null hy-
pothesis of no cointegration. However, for long-run asymmetry & SR symmetry
model, t-test statistic is between the lower and upper critical values, so we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of cointegration. In this case, we can consider the exis-
tence of long-run relationship between the EMBI+ and the explanatory variables
for Turkey.
Regarding F -test and t-test statistics for Brazil: t-test statistic is between its
lower and upper critical value for LR asymmetry & SR symmetry, indicating we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of cointegration for this case. The three oth-
ers of t-test statistic exceed their upper critical values, suggesting that we reject
the null hypothesis of no cointegration. As seen, only F -test statistic of long-run
& short-run asymmetry model is rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration
while others F -test statistics are between their lower and upper critical values,
reporting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Hence,
both t-statistic and F -statistic confirm to reject the null hypothesis of no coin-
tegration if we allow the short-run and long-run asymmetric. By considering the
existence of long-run cointegration for symmetric model, we can therefore conclude
the cointegration between EMBI+ and the explanatory variables for Brazil.
In total, the preferred models that we will present in the next section which
are symmetric model and LR asymmetric & SR symmetric model for Turkey, and
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symmetric model and long-run & short-run asymmetric model for Brazil.
Table 5.3 reports the long-run estimations of the ARDL symmetric and asym-
metric models for Turkey and Brazil. The error correction terms are significant at
1% level for four case of Turkey and Brazil.
The overall impression is the sign of all coefficients long-run is as expected and
consistent with the economic theory.
The sign coefficient of the current account for Turkey is negative as expected
for two cases, but it is not significant statistically with symmetric model, and it
becomes significant with long-run asymmetry model at 5% level. The long-run
coefficient of the current account with symmetric model for Turkey is -3.574, in-
dicating that the increase (decrease) by 3.574 of LMBI makes the current account
to improve (decline). The long-run coefficients of the positive and negative com-
ponent of the current account are -8.065, -6.565 respectively, implying that LMBI
increases -8.065 when the current account improves 1% and decreases 6.565 when
the current account declines 1%. The asymmetric long-run effect is confirmed by
the Wald test (9.659) that exceeds its upper critical value of M. Hashem Pesaran
et al. 2001, reflecting the fact that we reject the null hypothesis of symmetric in
the model.
The long-run coefficient of the current account with symmetric model for Brazil
is weaker than one of Turkey which is -0.902. The long-run coefficients of the posi-
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Symmetric ARDL NARDL with LR asymmetry
Turkey Var. Coeff. t-stat Var. Coeff. t-stat
ρe -0.491*** -3.813 ρe -0.492*** -3.586
ρc -1.755 -1.113 ρ+c -3.968** -2.561
ρd 0.854*** 4.155 ρ−c -3.230** -2.105
ρr -1.747** -2.421 ρr -0.551 -0.736
ρd 0.766*** 3.841
Lca -3.574 L+ca -8.065
Ld 1.739 L−ca -6.565
Lr -3.558 Ld 1.557
R2 0.701 Lr -1.119
tBMD -3.586
FPSS 4.784
R2 0.626
Brazil Symmetric ARDL NARDL with LR,SR asymmetry
ρe -0.409*** -3.217 ρe -0.529*** -3.941
ρc -0.369 -0.312 ρ+c -0.643 -0.452
ρd 0.477*** 3.065 ρ−c -3.536* -1.879
ρd 0.994*** 4.179
Lca -0.902 L+ca -1.216
Ld 1.166 L−ca -6.684
R2 0.646 Ld 1.879
tBMD -3.941
FPSS 4.777
R2 0.757
Notes: we apply a general-to-specific approach to find the final specification by setting p = q = 4. L+ca,
Lca, Lca, Ld and Lr are the long-run coefficients of the current account, the external debt and international
reserves to LMBI. tBMD denotes the t-statistic of Banerjee et al. 1998 and FPSS is the F-statistic of
M. Hashem Pesaran et al. 2001 testing the null hypothesis ρe = 0 and ρe = ρc = ρd = 0 respectively
Table 5.3: Long-run estimates of the symmetric and asymmetric current account
pass-through
5.3. Econometrics Results 137
tive, negative component of the current account for Brazil are -1.216, -6.684 respec-
tively, suggesting that LMBI increases 1.216 when the current account improves
1% and decreases 6.684 when the current account declines 1%. More specifically,
the positive component effect is higher than the negative one for Turkey but that
phenomenon is on the other way round for Brazil. The long-run asymmetric for
Turkey is confirmed by the Wald test (9.659) that exceeds its upper critical value
of M. Hashem Pesaran et al. 2001, reporting that we reject the null hypothesis of
symmetry in the model.
The finding of the long-run coefficient of the external debt for Turkey is 1.739 in
symmetric model which is higher than 1.557 for the asymmetric model, announc-
ing that LMBI will increases (decreases) 1.739 and 1.557 when the external debt
increases (declines) 1% for the symmetric model and asymmetric model respec-
tively. But in Brazil, the long-run coefficient of the external debt is 1.116 smaller
than the one when we allow both long-run and short-run asymmetric effect that
is 1.879, revealing that LMBI increases (decreases) 1.116, 1.879 when the external
debt increases (declines) 1%.
Comparing our results with the finding of Petrova et al. 2010, who use the
pooled mean group approach for 14 emerging markets including Turkey and Brazil.
The long-run coefficient current account varies from -3.033 to -3.364, and the long-
run coefficient external debt flutters from 2.205 to 2.655. The previous results have
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just linear coefficients for all countries including Turkey and Brazil which do not
distinct the impact of the positive and negative shocks. Successfully, our findings
show clearly the change of the LMBI with the different positive and negative
shocks.
The long-run coefficients of international reserves for Turkey are -3.558 for
symmetric model and -1.119 for asymmetric model, signalling if Turkey’s govern-
ment increases its liquidity then EMBI+ decreases -3.558, -1.119 for the symmet-
ric model and asymmetric model respectively. We do not present international
reserves for the Brazil in this chapter because the sign of long-run coefficient of
international reserves is positive not as expected with theoretical economic.
The long-run asymmetric statistic test for Brazil is confirmed by the Wald test
(4.829) that exceeds its upper the critical value of M. Hashem Pesaran et al. 2001,
indicating we reject the null hypothesis of symmetric in the model, and the Wald
test for short-run asymmetric is 1.727 below the its critical value, but we cannot
to reject the null hypothesis of short-run symmetry.
From the view point of risk management, the findings of Turkey show very
interesting. In order to reduce country risk, the current account and international
reserves have more important role than the external debt in long-run. The role of
these two factors is almost equality in the symmetric model (Lca = −3.574, Lr =
−3.558,). But improving the current account will reduce higher than increasing
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international reserves (L+ca = −8.065, Lr = −1.119,). In to order explain the role
of external debt, the government has sufficient time in long-run to restructure the
external debt. For the Brazil, we do not find the same results.
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 present the short-run coefficients of the symmetric and
asymmetric model for the Turkey and Brazil respectively.
Symmetric ARDL NARDL with LR asymmetry
Turkey Var. Coeff. t-stat Var. Coeff. t-stat
∆LEt−1 0.512** 2.485 ∆LEt−1 0.329*** 2.067
∆LEt−2 - - ∆LEt−2 - -
∆LEt−3 0.173 1.165 ∆LEt−3 - -
∆LEt−4 0.302** 2.063 ∆LEt−4 - -
∆CAt - - ∆CAt - -
∆CAt−1 0.982 0.780 ∆CAt−1 0.771 0.607
∆CAt−2 - - ∆CAt−2 - -
∆CAt−3 - - ∆CAt−3 - -
∆CAt−4 - - ∆CAt−4 - -
∆EDt 0.511*** 3.083 ∆EDt 0.575*** 3.739
∆EDt−1 - - ∆EDt−1 - -
∆EDt−2 -0.727** -2.653 ∆EDt−2 - -
∆EDt−3 -0.167 -1.099 ∆EDt−3 - -
∆EDt−4 -0.281* -2.002 ∆EDt−4 - -
∆RESt - - ∆RESt - -
∆RESt−1 -2.535*** -2.952 ∆RESt−1 -1.992*** -2.774
∆RESt−2 2.956** 2.260 ∆RESt−2 - -
∆RESt−3 - - ∆RESt−3 - -
∆RESt−4 - - ∆RESt−4 - -
c 2.092*** 2.901 c 2.049*** 3.018
Notes: we apply a general-to-specific approach to find the final specification by setting p = q = 4. Lca
and Ldare the long-run coefficients of current account and external debt to LMBI. tBMD denotes the t-
statistic of Banerée(1998) and FPSS is the F-statistic of PSS(2001) testing the null hypothesis ρe = 0 and
ρe = ρc = ρd = 0 respectively
Table 5.4: Short-run estimates of the symmetric and asymmetric model for Turkey
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Symmetric ARDL NARDL with LR, SR asymmetry
Brazil Var. Coeff. t-stat Var. Coeff. t-stat
∆LEt−1 0.223* 1.793 ∆LEt−1 0.411** 2.309
∆LEt−2 - - ∆LEt−2 - -
∆LEt−3 0.156 1.259 ∆LEt−3 0.341* -2.001
∆LEt−4 - - ∆LEt−4 0.333** 2.128
∆CAt - - ∆CA+t - -
∆CAt−1 - - ∆CA+t−1 - -
∆CAt−2 -2.504 -1.543 ∆CA+t−2 -7.829** -2.463
∆CAt−3 - - ∆CA+t−3 - -
∆CAt−4 - - ∆CA+t−4 - -
∆EDt 1.248*** 6.691 ∆CA−t -10.453** -2.320
∆EDt−1 - - ∆CA−t−1 - -
∆EDt−2 - - ∆CA−t−2 - -
∆EDt−3 - - ∆CA−t−3 -6.141* -1.707
∆EDt−4 - - ∆CA−t−4 - -
c 2.005*** 3.127 ∆EDt 1.671*** 6.308
∆EDt−1 -0.848** -2.701
∆EDt−2 - -
∆EDt−3 -0.361 -1.279
∆EDt−4 -0.822** -2.764
c 1.743** 2.504
Notes: we apply a general-to-specific approach to find the final specification by setting p = q = 4. Lca
and Ldare the long-run coefficients of current account and external debt to LMBI. tBMD denotes the t-
statistic of Banerée(1998) and FPSS is the F-statistic of PSS(2001) testing the null hypothesis ρe = 0 and
ρe = ρc = ρd = 0 respectively
Table 5.5: Short-run estimates of the symmetric and asymmetric model for Brazil
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As shown in Table 5.4, 5.5: in Turkey, the short-run coefficients of the cur-
rent account are not significant for both symmetric model and follows long-run
asymmetric model. The other coefficients of the external debt and international
reserves are significant in short-run, indicating the important role in short-run to
determine the EMBI+.
The short-run results for Brazil are very interesting vis-à-vis in Turkey. The
short-run of the current account is not significant with symmetric model, it be-
comes significant when the model allows long-run and short-run asymmetric effect.
The external debt coefficient is significant in short-run for both two case, implying
the level of EMBI+ in short-run depends on the reimburse capacity of the external
debt.
The dynamic multipliers up to 40 quarters presented in Figure 5.1 based on
Equation (5.7). This shows the new long-run equilibrium for the EMBI+ with
the positive and negative shock of the current account from an initial long-run
equilibrium.
The evolution of dynamic multipliers in symmetric model for Turkey and Brazil
is the same by regarding two peak shocks after 4 periods and 11 periods (about 1
year and 2 year respectively). An seen, the dynamic multipliers go to the long-run
equilibrium after about 4 years.
These findings in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.1 show the presence of the positive
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Figure 5.1: Dynamic multipliers
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and negative shock of the current account on the EMBI+. In fact, when we
allow only asymmetric long-run effect for Turkey, the sovereign bond responds very
asymmetric in positive and negative shock of the current account with reference
to Figure 5.1, suggesting the sovereign bond run to equilibrium after 2 years. In
view of the Brazil’s curves of dynamics multipliers, there is a great shock positive
and negative of the current account after 1 year and 2 years, and the only positive
effect is not significant during the third year. This explication maybe from without
international reserves effect in the model. The new equilibrium takes after 4 years
to converge to the long-run multipliers. From a risk-management point of view, the
positive and negative shock of the current account provides the useful information
for predict the sovereign bond.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the recent technique of asymmetric modelling
proposed by Shin et al. 2014 in order to determine the sovereign bond index by
the current account, the external debt and international reserves for Turkey and
Brazil in the period 2000.Q1-2011.Q4. We used the positive and negative partial
sum compositions of the current account expressing the excess current account
and the deficit current account in order to determine their asymmetric effect on
the sovereign bond index.
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The findings from the bounds test of t-test and F -test statistic proposed by
Banerjee et al. 1998; M. Hashem Pesaran et al. 2001 respectively highlight the
existence of long-run cointegration between the Emerging Market Bond Index Plus
and the three explanatory variables for both countries in the symmetric model, for
Turkey in only long-run asymmetry model and for Brazil with both long-run,
short-run asymmetric model.
Our results suggest a great asymmetric long-run effect of the current account
on the sovereign bond of Turkey and Brazil in a model including variables such
as the external debt and international reserves. Especially, we only detect long-
run asymmetric effect for Turkey while both long-run and short-run asymmetric
effects exist for Brazil. The sign of international reserves variable for Brazil does
not corroborate economic theory when we allow the short-run and asymmetric
long-run effect.
The asymmetric long-run coefficients of the current account are greater than
one of symmetry for both Turkey and Brazil. Besides, the asymmetric long-run
coefficients of the external debt and international reserves for Turkey are smaller
than one of symmetry. This finding highlights the importance of precisely spec-
ifying the long-run relationship when we allow asymmetric effect. In addition,
the positive component of the current account is higher than the negative one for
Turkey. In contrast, the positive component of the current account is smaller than
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the negative one for Brazil. These issues can be interpreted that the positive com-
ponent of the current account is stronger impact to EMBI+ than the negative one
for Turkey, but it reverses for Brazil. The asymmetric long-run coefficient of the
external debt is greater than one of symmetry for Brazil. This result means the
allowing for asymmetry increases the magnitude and the significance for Brazil.
The finding of dynamic multipliers permits to capture the new long-run equi-
librium from the initial equilibrium which confirms the long-run coefficients effect
of these explanatory variables. This useful information will provide good strategies
to risk managers for the future.
146CHAPTER 5. Long-run determinants of sovereign bond in emerging markets
General Conclusion
The main objective of this thesis is to determine the sovereign default risk in
emerging countries. How can we determine and evaluate the sovereign default risk
in emerging countries? What are types of model and indicators to express the
sovereign default risk? These questions are addressed in the five chapters of this
thesis (except the general introduction and the general conclusion).
My first contribution was to resume a global picture of the literature reviews
of the sovereign default risk. We talked briefly about the history of default and
the default cost when the government decides to default. The most important
contribution in this chapter is the conceptual and methodological issues as well as
findings from selected theoretical and empirical researches focusing on the deter-
mination of sovereign default risk: the structural model, the dynamic stochastic
model and the econometric model. Each approach has some limitations that were
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my avenue of research in the next chapter.
We could separate the four empirical results into two channels: the first one
is a structure model & a stochastic model (chapter two and chapter three) and
the second one is econometric models (chapter four and chapter five). Chapter 2
show a method to calculate the sovereign default probability. Chapter 3 propose to
estimate the sovereign spread credit. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 aim to empirically
investigate the aspects related to these issues for the long-run, short-run (chapter
4) and long-run asymmetric effects (chapter 5).
In the second chapter, we presented how to transfer the credit risk model in
corporate level to sovereign default model by using the model of Gray et al. 2007.
We provided empirical evidence from Argentina. Our aim of this chapter was to
verify the evolution of Argentina’s default in 2002 and the post-default period.
Cause of availability data, we studied in annual data for a small period from 1997-
2009. The result of this chapter recognized that Argentina’s default probability
rose from 1997 to 2002 and dropped in the post-crisis period. At the same time, it
also describes the Argentina’s economic situation where it had the biggest default
in the twenty-first century. Another important issue that we mentioned is to
clarify the role of option pricing and the Ito’s lemma in order to extend a gap in
the structural model. In the next chapter, the default date is defined at the first
time, instead of maturity, when the sovereign asset infer to the default barrier.
General Conclusion 149
The third chapter aimed to create a stochastic model of the sovereign default
risk in some emerging markets so as to compute the daily sovereign spread credit.
We proposed two policies when the sovereign defaults: an increase of corporate
income tax and a reduce of a part of debt. In order to validate this model, then
when we verified and compared the results obtained with the index observed from
the market if they are consistent together, we found: firstly, the evolution between
estimated sovereign credit spread and Emerging Market Bond Index plus (EMBI+)
is fairly homogeneous in the period from 2000 to 2011. Secondly, by using a simple
regression between them, the positive sign of this relationship and coefficients are
0.634, 0.8158, 0.7549, 0.437 for Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Turkey respectively,
confirming when the EMBI+ increases (decreases), the estimated sovereign credit
will increase (decrease) 63.4%, 81.58%, 75.49%, 43.7% for Brazil, Mexico, Peru
and Turkey respectively. A fascinating question appeared "This strong relationship
will verify in the long-run?" leads our interest to examine. To do that, using the
cointegration test of Johansen 1991, 1995 we found the existence of cointegration
between the estimated sovereign credit spread and the EMBI. That explains that
the sovereign credit spread and EMBI also have a same/similar evolution in the
long-run. As a result, this finding can help us respond the question above. In the
long-run, it exists, in fact, a strong relationship between the estimated sovereign
credit spread and the EMBI+. This result also opens a new index of the sovereign
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default risk that would assist risk managers and regulators in designing policies
aim to reduce a country default risk.
The fourth chapter has attempted to find out the long-run determinant of
the sovereign CDS spread for eight emerging countries in the 2008.Q4-2013.Q2
periods. The sovereign CDS spread is a proxy of the sovereign default risk. This
feature can be explained by three factors related to the government’s solvency, the
government’s liquidity and macroeconomic situation that are the external debt,
international reserves and the current account respectively. These variables are
the most important to evaluate the sovereign default risk. We opted for the Pooled
Mean Group cointegration estimation in order to study the long-run and short-run
sovereign CDS spread. We were successful to find that all variables are integrated
with the same order I(1), and there is an existence of cointegration between these
variables indicated above. So that we validated the necessary conditions to use
the Pooled Mean Group estimation.
Our main results obtained from the Pooled Mean Group cointegration estima-
tion suggest that: first, the coefficients of the current account, the external debt
and international reserves are significant in the long-run for all countries. Second,
we found the negative effect of the current account, international reserves and the
positive effect of the external debt on the sovereign CDS spread in long-run. Third,
we find interesting that international reserves have the largest impact which will
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help regulators designing policies aiming at increasing international reserves rather
than solving the external debt burden and the current account deficit. Last, in
short run was significant just for the external debt and international reserves, not
for the current account in short-run.
The last chapter analysed the asymmetric long-run and short-run determinants
of sovereign bond index, which is a proxy of sovereign default, for two typical
emerging countries: Turkey and Brazil in the 2000.Q1-2011.Q4 period. Likewise
the fourth chapter, the sovereign default risk was explained by the government’s
solvency, the government’s liquidity and macroeconomic situation (the external
debt, international reserves and the current account respectively). We used pos-
itive and negative partial sum compositions of the current account in order to
determine how it has an asymmetric effect on sovereign bond based on Shin et al.
2014. In addition, we also opted for the bounds tests of t-statistic and F-statistic
proposed by Banerjee et al. 1998; M. Hashem Pesaran et al. 2001 respectively to
study the existence of the co-integration between the EMBI and the explanatory
variables that is the necessary condition to apply the asymmetric effect model of
Shin et al. 2014. Results obtained link that it exists the cointegration between
them for the two countries in the symmetric model, for Turkey in only long-run
asymmetry model, and for Brazil with both long-run, short-run asymmetric mod-
els.
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Our main empirical results provide interesting findings: first, we detected only
asymmetric long-run for Turkey and both asymmetric short-run and long-run effect
for Brazil. Second, the asymmetric long-run effect of the current account is greater
than symmetric model for both Turkey and Brazil. But the asymmetric long-run
coefficients of the external debt and international reserves for Turkey are smaller
then one of symmetry for Turkey, whereas the asymmetric long-run coefficient of
the external debt is greater than one of symmetry for Brazil. This issues feature
the importance of precisely specifying the long-run relationship when we allow
asymmetric effect. Third, more precisely, the long run coefficients of the positive
and negative components of the current account for Turkey are - 8.065, -6.565
respectively. This means that LMBI decreases 8.065 when the current account
improves 1 % and decreases 6.565 when the current account decline 1 %. The
long-run coefficients of the positive are negative components of the current account
for Brazil are -1.216, -6.684 respectively. This suggests that LMBI decreases 1.216
when the current account improves 1 % and decreases 6.684 when the current
account declines 1%. Last, the dynamic multipliers could capture the positive and
negative shocks of the current account on the EMBI from an initial equilibrium to
the new equilibrium. Basing this dynamic multipliers, regulators can design good
strategies to risk managers for the future.
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Research Outlook
Overall impression, my thesis provided and filled some gaps in the research of
sovereign default risk. However, this thesis may have some limitations and further
research to extend our results in the future.
The main gap is availability data (chapter two and chapter five). In the second
chapter, although we only used the annual data in the short period (1997-2009), we
obtained the evolution of Argentina’s default probability which is similar strongly
with the Argentina’s economic situation. However, this result cannot reflects the
significance statistically in econometric. Furthermore, in the chapter five, we only
used 44 observations but we also find out the great results which is an asymmetric
effect of the current account on the Emerging Market Bond Index Plus. In fact,
this gap was solved in previous published articles of two authors: Romilly et al.
2001; Narayan 2005. Especially, Narayan 2005 based on the article of M. Hashem
Pesaran et al. 2001 in order to produce a table of the F-statistic critical value for
30-80 observations to compare F-statistic critical value and F-estimated value in
the bounds testing. Therefore, this means that new interesting research results is
found which are more important than the constraint of data availability.
An interesting research question will be extended in the third chapter: “how can
we determine sovereign credit spread if a country has an initial gross endowment
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as in the paper of Andrade 2009 and the use of other collateral assets in order
to borrow from the international market?”. In fact, when a country has an initial
gross endowment and other collateral assets, the sovereign liquidity will increase.
Therefore, this feature will affect the sovereign credit spread.
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Appendix A
Lemma A.1.
Let Vt be a GBM follow with the drift µ and volatility σ.
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(u−t)Vudu
]
=
Vt
µ− r
Proof. See Andrade 2009
Lemma A.2.
Let Vt be a GBM follow with the drift µ and volatility σ. Let VD < Vt and
TD = min {u : Vu = VD}:
Et
[
e−r(T−t)
]
=
(
Vt
VD
)β
where β = − 2r
σ2
Proof. See page 349 of Shreve 2004 or Andrade 2009.
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Proof. of Proposition 1
The "net sovereign asset (NSA)" is proven based on the appendix of Andrade
2009:
NSA = Et
[∫ TD
t
(τVu − C)e−r(u−t)du+
∫ ∞
TD
{(τ + ∆)Vu − (1− φ)C}e−r(u−t)du
]
− Et
[
λτVDe
−r(TD−t)] (8)
where
Et
[∫ TD
t
(τVu − C)e−r(u−t)du
]
= Et
[∫ ∞
t
(τVu − C)e−r(u−t)du
]
− Et
[∫ ∞
TD
(τVu − C)e−r(u−t)du
]
(9)
=
τVt
r − µ −
C
r
− Et
[
e−r(T−t)du
]
ETD
[∫ ∞
TD
(τVu − C)e−r(u−t)du
]
=
τVt
r − µ −
C
r
−
(
Vt
VD
)β (
τVD
r − µ −
C
r
)
(10)
Et
[∫ ∞
TD
{(τ + ∆)Vu − (1− φ)C}e−r(u−t)du
]
=
(
Vt
VD
)β (
(τ + ∆)VD
r − µ −
(1− φ)C
r
)
Et
[
λτVDe
−r(TD−t)] = λτVD( Vt
VD
)β
we obtain :
NSA =
τVt
r − µ −
C
r
+
(
Vt
VD
)β [(
∆
r − µ − λτ
)
VD +
φC
r
]
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Proof. of Proposition 2
The "default barrier" is proven based on the appendix of Jeanneret 2013: The
default barrier is found by taken the first-order maximization of the net sovereign
asset ∂NSA
∂Vt
.
∂NSA
∂Vt
=
τ
r − µ +
βV β−1t
V βD
[
VD
(
∆
r − µ − λτ
)
+
φC
r
]
Using the smooth-pasting condition ∂NSA
∂Vt
∣∣∣∣
Vt=VD
= ∂NSA(V=VD)
∂VD
(Robert C Mer-
ton 1974)
where ∂NSA(V=VD)
∂VD
=
τ
r − µ +
(
∆
r − µ − λτ
)
we obtain:
V ∗D =
Cφβ(r − µ)
r(1− β)[∆− λτ(r − µ)] = Cϕ
Proof. of Proposition 3:
Sovereign Credit Spread (SCS) is demonstrated based on Jeanneret 2013
SCS =
C
D
− r = r
 1
1− φ
(
Vt
VD
)β − 1
 = r
 1
1− φ
(
Vt
Cϕ
)β − 1

where D is the sovereign debt. Using Lemma A.2 we found :
D = Et
[∫ TD
t
Ce−r(u−t)du
]
+Et
[∫ ∞
TD
(1− φ)Ce−r(u−t)du
]
=
C
r
[
1− φ
(
Vt
Cϕ
)β]
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Résumé en Français: Cette thèse sur travaux empiriques en quatre articles s’intéresse
aux déterminants de risque de défaut souverain. Le premier chapitre résume l’état de l’art
du risque de défaut souverain et trois principales approches des déterminants du risque de
défaut souverain: le modèle structurel, le modèle dynamique stochastique et les modèles
économétriques. Le deuxième chapitre étudie la probabilité de défaut de l’Argentine
(2002) en utilisant un modèle structurel proposé par Gray and Malone 2008. Le troisième
chapitre propose un modèle stochastique afin de calculer le spread du crédit souverain
journalier. Les deux derniers chapitres économétriques déterminent deux proxies du
risque de défaut souverain: Sovereign CDS spread et Emerging Market Bond Index Plus
(EMBI+). Le quatrième chapitre essaye de déterminer le sovereign CDS spread à long-
terme et court-terme en utilisant trois estimations: Pooled Mean Group, Mean Group
et Dynamic Fixed Effect. Dans le dernier chapitre, on applique un modèle non-linéaire
asymétrique Autorégressif à retards échelonnés pour étudier l’effet d’asymétrie à long-
terme de compte courant sur l’EMBI+ y compris les variables explicatives telles que la
dette extérieure et les réserves internationales pour deux pays émergents: la Turquie et
le Brésil.
Titre en anglais: Essays on sovereign default risk in emerging countries
Titre en français: Essais sur le risque de défaut souverain dans les pays émergents
Résumé en anglais: This thesis on empirical results in four articles focused on the
determinants of the sovereign default risk. The first chapter summarizes the state of the
art of sovereign default risk and the three main approaches of determinants of sovereign
default risk: the structure model, the dynamic stochastic model and the econometric
models. The second chapter studies the default probability in Argentina (2002) by us-
ing a structural model proposed by Gray and Malone 2008. The third chapter provides
a stochastic model to calculate the daily sovereign credit spread. Last two econometric
chapters determine two sovereign default risk proxies: Sovereign CDS spread and Emerg-
ing Market Bond Index Plus. The fourth chapter focuses on the sovereign CDS spread in
long-run and short-run by using three estimations of Pooled Mean Group, Mean Group
and Dynamic Fixed Effect. The last chapter applies a nonliear Autoregressive Distributed
Lag asymmetry model to study the long-run asymmetric effect of the current account to
the EMBI+ including the explanatory variables such as the external debt and interna-
tional reserves for the two typical emerging countries Turkey and Brazil
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Intitulé et adresse du laboratoire : Centre d’Économie de Paris Nord, 99 avenue Jean-
Baptiste Clément, 93430 Villetaneuse.
